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kathryn a.  watts  
 
Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and 
Capricious Review 
abstract .  Current conceptions of “arbitrary and capricious” review focus on whether 
agencies have adequately explained their decisions in statutory, factual, scientific, or otherwise 
technocratic terms. Courts, agencies, and scholars alike, accordingly, generally have accepted the 
notion that influences from political actors, including the President and Congress, cannot 
properly help to explain administrative action for purposes of arbitrary and capricious review. 
This means that agencies today tend to sweep political influences under the rug even when such 
influences offer the most rational explanation for the action. This Article argues that this picture 
should change. 
 Specifically, this Article argues for expanding current conceptions of arbitrary and 
capricious review beyond a singular technocratic focus so that credit would also be awarded to 
certain political influences that an agency transparently discloses and relies upon in its 
rulemaking record. Such an expansion of arbitrary and capricious review could yield many 
benefits. First, it would help to bring arbitrary and capricious review into harmony with other 
major doctrines, such as Chevron deference, that seem to embrace the “political control” model of 
agency decisionmaking. Second, it could help to create a more effective separation between 
science and politics. Third, giving politics a place could give courts another reason to defer to 
agencies, thereby softening the “ossification” charge frequently levied against arbitrary and 
capricious review. Finally, such a change would facilitate greater political accountability and 
monitoring. 
 Ultimately, whether an expanded conception of arbitrary and capricious review can be 
attained will rest in the hands of courts and agencies. Agencies would need to begin openly 
acknowledging political influences, and courts would need to become comfortable 
acknowledging that an agency’s reliance on political influences involving policy considerations 
and value judgments, such as a President’s desire to push a specific environmental issue to the 
top of the EPA’s priority list, might help legitimize an agency’s decision. This Article suggests 
that courts and agencies might be most comfortable first making this move in narrow contexts, 
such as decisions to deny discretionary rulemaking petitions. 
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to Bill Andersen, Jack Beermann, Clark Lombardi, Tom Merrill, Sallie Sanford, Jim Speta, Peter 
Strauss, and Amy Wildermuth for helpful comments and also to participants in a faculty 
workshop at the University of Washington. Also thanks to Rachel King and Marissa Olsson for 
excellent research assistance. 
WATTS_119_2.DOC  
proposing a place for politics 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
article contents 
introduction 5 
i. a focus on expert, not politicized, agency decisionmaking 14 
A. The Judiciary’s Search for Expert-Based Decisionmaking 15 
B. Agencies’ Focus on Technocratic Factors 23 
C. Scholars’ Acceptance of the Push for Expertise 29 
ii. the benefits of giving politics a place 32 
A. Bringing Greater Coherence to Administrative Law’s Vacillation Between  
 Expertise and Politics 33 
B. Creating Better Separation Between Science and Politics 40 
C. Softening the “Ossification” Charge 41 
D. Enabling Greater Political Accountability 42 
iii. the mechanics of giving politics a place 45 
A. Determining Congress’s Intent Regarding Political Factors 45 
B. Types of Political Factors That Might Appropriately Be Relied Upon 53 
C. Possible Sources of Political Influences 57 
1. Presidential Directives, Executive Orders, and Other More Informal  
  Communications 57 
2. Communications from Other Executive Officials 60 
3. Congressional Oversight 63 
D. Types of Rulemaking Proceedings in Which Political Factors Might  
 Appropriately Play a Role 65 
1. Denials of Rulemaking Petitions 66 
2. Withdrawals of Proposed Rules 70 
3. Rule Rescissions 71 
4. Promulgation of Final Rules 72 
WATTS_119_2.DOC  
the yale law journal 119:2   2009  
4 
 
iv. objections to giving politics a place 73 
A. The First-Mover Dilemma 74 
B. Balancing The Carrot With A Stick 76 
C. Judicial Dislike of Agency Politicization 77 
D. Separation of Powers Concerns 79 
E. Difficulty of Judicial Review 80 
conclusion 84 
WATTS_119_2.DOC  
proposing a place for politics 
5 
 
introduction 
At its core, arbitrary and capricious review, or “hard look” review as it is 
sometimes called, enables courts to ensure that administrative agencies justify 
their decisions with adequate reasons.1 Although existing case law does not 
always make it easy to separate reasons that “adequately” support an agency 
decision from those that are “inadequate,”2 the Supreme Court’s famous 1983 
decision in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto 
Insurance Co.3 has been read to clarify one important aspect of arbitrary and 
capricious review: agencies should explain their decisions in technocratic, 
statutory, or scientifically driven terms, not political terms.4 
 
1.  The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires that agencies act in a manner that passes 
“arbitrary and capricious” review. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). The term “hard look” 
review developed in the D.C. Circuit as a judicial gloss on the meaning of the APA’s 
arbitrary and capricious test. See Matthew Warren, Active Judging: Judicial Philosophy and the 
Development of the Hard Look Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 90 GEO. L.J. 2599 (2002); see also 
infra notes 51-74 and accompanying text (discussing the development of hard look review). 
Even though hard look review calls for a more searching and less deferential type of judicial 
review than section 706(2)(A) may have originally contemplated, see infra notes 44-52 and 
accompanying text, this Article uses the terms hard look review and arbitrary and capricious 
review interchangeably to refer to the reason-giving requirement that agencies now face 
under the modern reading of section 706(2)(A). In other words, this Article does not 
attempt to attack the existence of hard look review per se, but rather suggests a modification 
of hard look review. 
2.  As Professor Richard Pierce has aptly explained, “adequacy is in the eye of the beholder,” 
which makes it quite difficult for agencies to predict whether or not a court will deem an 
agency’s explanation to be sufficient. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 84-85 
(2008). 
3.  463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
4.  See CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF 
BUREAUCRACY 183 (1990) (noting that State Farm “entails a conception of politics as 
distinguishable from and in opposition to the required rationality of agency decision 
making”); JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 226 
(1990) (“[T]he submerged yet powerful message in the Supreme Court’s decision in State 
Farm [was] that the political directions of a particular administration are inadequate to 
justify regulatory policy.”); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2246, 
2381 (2001) (describing how State Farm demanded that the agency “justify its decision in 
neutral, expertise-laden terms to the fullest extent possible”); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Story of 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the U.S. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co.: Law, Science and Politics in the Administrative State, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
STORIES 335, 335 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006) (noting that in State Farm, “politics and 
ideology were required to take a backseat to administrative law’s demand for reasoned 
policy judgment”); Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 
106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 307 n.191 (2006) (noting that State Farm now serves as “common 
contemporary shorthand for the requirement that agencies rationalize their decisions in 
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In State Farm, the Court reviewed a decision made by the new Reagan 
Administration’s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) 
to rescind a rule previously promulgated under the Carter Administration that 
required certain cars to be equipped with either air bags or automatic seat 
belts.5 In a partial dissent, then-Justice Rehnquist openly noted that the 
NHTSA’s changed views seemed “to be related to the election of a new 
President,” which Rehnquist viewed as “a perfectly reasonable basis for an 
executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and 
regulations.”6 The majority, however, skipped over the political context of the 
decision,7 and it instead focused on the technocratic justifications that the 
NHTSA offered to support its rule rescission.8 The Court’s singular focus in 
State Farm on technocratic justifications, accordingly, has been widely read to 
represent the triumph of expertise to the exclusion of politics in administrative 
decisionmaking.9 
Ever since the Court handed down State Farm, agencies, courts, and 
scholars alike generally seem to have accepted the view that influences coming 
from one political branch or another cannot be allowed to explain 
administrative decisionmaking, even if such factors are influencing agency 
decisionmaking. Take agencies to begin with. Agencies today generally try to 
meet their reason-giving duties under State Farm by couching their decisions in 
technocratic, statutory, or scientific language, either failing to disclose or 
affirmatively hiding political factors that enter into the mix. A good example of 
this can be found by looking at the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) 
attempt in the 1990s to regulate teen smoking. Even though President Clinton 
played a very active role in directing the rulemaking (going so far as to 
personally announce the final rule in a Rose Garden ceremony), the FDA’s 
statement of basis and purpose accompanying the final rule relied upon 
 
terms of statutory criteria, and that a change of administration is not a sufficient basis for 
agency action”). 
5.  State Farm, 463 U.S. at 32-38. 
6.  Id. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
7.  A likely explanation for this is that even the NHTSA itself did not openly seek to explain its 
decision based on political considerations. 
8.  See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 46-57; see also Michael Herz, The Rehnquist Court and 
Administrative Law, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 297, 310 (2004) (“Justice White did not contradict 
Justice Rehnquist’s description of the political setting or conclude that it was outweighed by 
other factors. Rather, he ignored it altogether, implicitly deeming the politics of the 
rescission simply irrelevant.”). 
9.  See supra note 4; see also infra Section I.A. (discussing the State Farm decision). 
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statutory, scientific, and expert justifications—barely even hinting at President 
Clinton’s role in the rulemaking.10 
Judicial review of agency action is similarly technocratic in focus. Courts 
applying arbitrary and capricious review today routinely search agency 
decisions to ensure they represent expert-driven decisionmaking.11 Decisions 
from the D.C. Circuit, for example, borrow from State Farm’s language and 
repeatedly frame arbitrary and capricious review in expert-driven terms, asking 
whether the agency “offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to 
the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed 
to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”12 
In terms of scholarly attention to the issue, a few scholars have given some 
attention to how arbitrary and capricious review might take politics into 
account.13 For the most part, however, the blanket rejection of politics in 
administrative decisionmaking has been casually accepted as the status quo by 
courts, agencies, and scholars alike. The result is that insufficient attention has 
been given to exploring whether political factors ought to be allowed to validly 
explain agency rulemaking decisions as a normative matter and what concrete 
alterations might be made to existing arbitrary and capricious review doctrine 
to embrace a proper, even if limited, place for politics. 
 
10.  See Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 965-67 (1997) 
(describing Clinton’s active involvement in the FDA’s tobacco rulemaking); see also infra 
notes 94-98 and accompanying text (discussing the FDA’s rulemaking proceeding). 
11.  See Kagan, supra note 4, at 2270 (noting that courts “requir[e] that agency action bear the 
indicia of essentially apolitical, ‘expert’ process and judgment”); see also infra Section I.A. 
(describing the judicial search for technocratic decisionmaking by agencies). 
12.  Wedgewood Vill. Pharmacy v. DEA, 509 F.3d 541, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (emphasis added) 
(internal quotations omitted); see also Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165, 177 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(drawing on State Farm). 
13.  See EDLEY, supra note 4, at 9, 59, 66, 170-94 (1990) (arguing that present judicial doctrine 
demonstrates an ineffectual ambivalence toward politics); MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS 
THE GUARDIANS: JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 171 (1988) (arguing that judges 
incorrectly treat agencies engaged in rulemaking as if the agencies are “bodies engaged in a 
true science of synoptic public administration” and that judges instead should treat agencies 
as “subordinate legislatures making a good deal of law within broad congressional 
constraints and in the face of considerable uncertainty about facts and diverse and changing 
political sentiments”); Kagan, supra note 4, at 2381-82; see also infra Section I.C. (describing 
scholarly attention given to the place of politics in agency decisionmaking). 
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This Article aims to give some much needed attention to the topic.14 
Specifically, this Article seeks to identify those rulemaking proceedings in 
which agencies acting as “mini legislatures” might most appropriately rely 
upon political influences coming from the President, other members of the 
executive branch, or Congress to justify agency decisions for purposes of 
arbitrary and capricious review.15 The heart of the argument set forth here is 
that what count as “valid” reasons under arbitrary and capricious review 
should be expanded to include certain political influences from the President, 
other executive officials, and members of Congress, so long as the political 
influences are openly and transparently disclosed in the agency’s rulemaking 
record. This means that the term “political influences,” as used in this Article, 
refers to influences aimed at agencies coming from executive and legislative 
actors, including the President, members of Congress, and those who speak for 
 
14.  This Article analyzes only the appropriate place of politics when an agency acts through 
rulemaking and thus does not deal with adjudication. There are two reasons for focusing 
exclusively on rulemaking. The first is practical: limiting the reach of this Article to the role 
of politics in rulemaking helps to make the scope and breadth of the topic more manageable. 
The second reason is more substantive: agencies play very different roles when engaging in 
rulemaking vs. adjudication. In the rulemaking context, agencies act as mini legislatures, 
whereas agencies act as mini courts in the adjudicatory context. This distinction may well 
demand a different role for politics in rulemaking vs. adjudication. Cf. Sierra Club v. Costle, 
657 F.2d 298, 400 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (distinguishing between agency adjudication, which 
resembles judicial action, and informal rulemaking of a policymaking sort, which does not 
implicate the same notions of due process). I, however, leave the answer to that question to 
another day—focusing only on rulemaking in this Article. 
15.  This Article focuses on arbitrary and capricious review and thus does not directly propose 
changes to other judicial review doctrines, such as Step Two of Chevron. In this sense, this 
Article proceeds under the understanding that arbitrary and capricious review and Step Two 
of Chevron deference are distinct in what they require—meaning that Chevron 
“reasonableness,” which is used to test the fit of an agency’s interpretation with a statute, 
does not equate to State Farm “reason giving,” which is used to assess the rationality of an 
agency’s reasoning process. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 
545 U.S. 967, 1001 n.4 (2005) (differentiating between Chevron Step Two and arbitrary and 
capricious analysis in noting that inconsistency in an agency’s position “bears on whether 
the Commission has given a reasoned explanation for its current position, not on whether 
its interpretation is consistent with the statute” under Chevron). There are, however, some 
scholars (as well as judicial opinions) that support the view that Step Two of Chevron 
merges with arbitrary and capricious review. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Regulatory Util. 
Comm’rs v. ICC, 41 F.3d 721, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Gen. Am. Transp. Corp. v. ICC, 872 
F.2d 1048, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two 
Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253 (1997); Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron—The 
Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 821, 827-28 (1990). If this view equating 
Chevron Step Two and arbitrary and capricious review were to be accepted, then the 
proposals set forth here would have implications for Step Two of Chevron as well. 
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and act for the President (such as the President’s Chief of Staff and the head of 
the Office of Management and Budget). 
Acceptance of the argument set forth here would not mean that any and all 
political influences would be allowed to legitimize agency action. Rather, some 
political influences should be read to justify agency action whereas other 
political influences should be read to corrupt. Although drawing a precise line 
between permissible and impermissible influences is difficult, legitimate 
political influences can roughly be thought of as those influences that seek to 
further policy considerations or public values, whereas illegitimate political 
influences can be thought of as those that seek to implement raw politics or 
partisan politics unconnected in any way to the statutory scheme being 
implemented. This would mean, for example, that the Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) would be allowed to rely upon a public statement 
issued by President Obama articulating his pro-choice agenda and his pro-
choice policy initiatives if HHS chose to rescind a Bush-era rule that forbids 
medical facilities that receive federal money from discriminating against health 
care providers who refuse, on religious grounds, to perform abortions.16 
Conversely, it would mean that HHS could not legitimately justify a decision 
to rescind the same Bush-era “provider conscience” rule by simply saying: 
“President Obama directed us to rescind the rule in order to reward various 
pro-choice organizations for their endorsement of him during his campaign.” 
Three recent developments highlight the timeliness and significance of this 
Article’s exploration of the proper role of politics. First, we are still in the early 
stages of a new presidential administration as President Obama settles into the 
White House and seeks to reprioritize agency goals.17 Shortly after winning the 
election in November 2008, then-President-elect Obama made clear that he 
had asked his transition team to begin reviewing the federal agencies and 
 
16.  See generally Laura Meckler, Bush-Era Abortion Rules Face Possible Reversal, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
17, 2008, at A5 (describing the so-called “provider conscience” rule); Robert Pear, Obama 
Will Ease Restraints on States’ Health Insurance Programs for Children, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 
2009, at A25 (reporting that Obama has said that “he objects to a last-minute Bush 
administration rule that grants sweeping new protections to health workers who refuse to 
help perform abortions, dispense contraceptives or provide other care because of their 
‘religious beliefs or moral convictions’”).  
17.  See generally Sam Kalen, Changing Administrations and Environmental Guidance Documents, 35 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 657, 659 (2008) (“With each new election cycle, the ability of the executive 
branch to influence policy on the myriad of issues—such as climate change—will surface. . . . 
[T]he modern administrative law state assumes that federal agencies will be imbued with 
the political philosophy of any new president and that they enjoy sufficient flexibility to 
develop and change policy.”). 
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considering changes to be made.18 In particular, President Obama has made it 
clear that he will order federal departments and agencies to act in ways that will 
promote energy efficiency and proenvironmental goals,19 and he has indicated 
his desire to implement a shift away from deregulation toward more proactive 
government regulation, largely as a response to the recent economic crisis.20 
These and other impending changes that will be implemented under the new 
administration point out the need to better understand whether and when it is 
appropriate for agencies to justify certain decisions based on political 
influences, such as campaign promises or presidential priorities.21 
Second, the Supreme Court recently issued two divided decisions that 
highlight the need to better understand whether politics should be given an 
accepted role in agency decisionmaking. In one decision issued in 2009, FCC v. 
Fox Television Stations, Inc., the Court reviewed the FCC’s change in its policy 
involving the broadcasting of fleeting expletives.22 In upholding the FCC’s new 
policy that fleeting expletives can be actionable, Justice Scalia’s opinion seemed 
comfortable with the fact that the FCC’s policy change was “spurred by 
significant political pressure from Congress.”23 In fact, Justice Scalia’s opinion, 
which rejects the notion that agency change must be subjected to more 
searching judicial review, arguably makes it easier for agencies to change their 
policies due to changes in the political wind.24 In contrast, in a dissenting 
opinion, Justice Breyer argued that existing law does not permit the FCC to 
 
18.  See Meckler, supra note 16; Peter Nicholas & Christi Parsons, Obama Plans a Swift Start, L.A. 
TIMES, Jan. 20, 2009, at A1; Editorial, Undoing the Damage Done, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2009, 
at WK9; Jeff Zeleny, Obama Reviewing Bush’s Use of Executive Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 
2008, at A19. 
19.  John M. Broder & Peter Baker, Obama’s Order Likely To Tighten Auto Standards, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 26, 2009, at A1. 
20.  See Kevin G. Hall & Margaret Talev, Obama to Financial Sector: More Regulation Is Coming, 
NEWS & OBSERVER, Dec. 10, 2008, at 1A; cf. Jackie Calmes, Both Sides of the Aisle See More 
Regulation, and Not Just of Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008, at A15 (reporting that the “pro-
regulation climate will probably spill over into other sectors” outside of just the financial 
industries and that “the political fallout of this renewed respect for government regulation is 
evidenced in the current election campaigns”). 
21.  President Obama made many campaign promises, a number of which involve 
administrative regulations and/or administrative agencies. See generally Robert Farley & 
Angie Drobnic Holan, 510 Campaign Promises and We’re Watching, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 
Jan. 15, 2009, at A1 (noting that Obama’s campaign promises call for “more regulation, new 
agencies and at least 11 new groups that would have ‘corps’ in their name”). 
22.  129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). 
23.  Id. at 1815-16. Justice Scalia was joined in this Part of the opinion only by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito—not by Justice Kennedy. 
24.  Id. at 1810. 
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“make policy choices for purely political reasons.”25 The split decision in Fox, 
accordingly, opens the door for more discussion about the proper role of 
politics. 
In the other recent decision—the Court’s 2007 “global warming” decision 
in Massachusetts v. EPA—the Court reviewed the EPA’s denial of a rulemaking 
petition that asked the EPA to regulate certain emissions from new motor 
vehicles that lead to global warming.26 In a split 5-4 decision, the Court rejected 
the EPA’s reasons for declining to regulate and sent the EPA back to the 
drawing board, embracing an expertise-driven notion of agency 
decisionmaking akin to what State Farm has been read to have embraced some 
twenty years earlier.27 
Although newspapers across the country immediately trumpeted the 
Massachusetts decision as a blockbuster case,28 the ramifications of the decision 
continue to unfold. After the Court’s decision came down in April 2007, the 
EPA went back to the drawing board, concluding that motor vehicle emissions 
do endanger the public health and welfare and that they should be regulated.29 
Based on this conclusion, the EPA sent a draft of proposed rules that would 
have regulated the emissions to the White House’s Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) for review in December 2007.30 OMB, however, reportedly 
chose to sit on the proposed rules, going so far as to tell EPA officials that it 
would not even open the EPA’s email message containing the proposed rules.31 
It was not until July 2008, after much back and forth between the EPA and the 
 
25.  Id. at 1829 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
26.  549 U.S. 497, 511-12 (2007). 
27.  See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 
SUP. CT. REV. 51, 54 (2007). 
28.  See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Say E.P.A. Has Power To Act on Harmful Gases, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007, at A1; Michael Hawthorne, EPA Must Regulate Greenhouse Gases, CHI. 
TRIB., Apr. 3, 2007, at 3. 
29.  Brad Knickerbocker, Bush’s ‘Caution’ on CO2 Seen as ‘Foot-Dragging’ by Critics, CHRISTIAN 
SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 3, 2008, at 17 (reporting that EPA staffers concluded that the emissions 
were a “major threat to water supplies, crops, wildlife, and other aspects of public welfare” 
and that this finding was “forwarded to the White House for review in December”); 
Christopher Lee, Scientists Report Political Interference, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2008, at A19 
(“[A] congressional committee recently reported that EPA staff members had determined in 
December that greenhouse gas emissions endanger public health . . . .”). 
30.  See Juliet Eilperin, White House Tried To Silence EPA Proposal on Car Emissions, WASH. POST, 
June 26, 2008, at A2; Editorial, More Flimflam on Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2008, at 
A16. 
31.  Felicity Barringer, White House Refused To Open E-mail on Pollutants, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 
2008, at A15. 
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White House,32 that the EPA finally issued not a set of proposed rules (as it 
initially proposed to do) but rather a diluted Advanced Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (ANPR) that gave the public an opportunity to comment on the 
issue before the EPA issued any proposed rules.33 Thus, political forces at OMB 
during the Bush Administration trumped the EPA’s initial attempts to exercise 
its expertise to propose rules regulating the emissions. Things then changed 
again when President Obama came into office in 2009, and the EPA under 
Obama determined that greenhouse gases do pose a danger to the public’s 
health and welfare.34 This prominent political zigzagging highlights the tension 
between expertise and politics and underscores the need to better understand 
what role politics should properly play in administrative decisionmaking. 
Finally, a third recent development that highlights the need to gain a better 
understanding of the proper place of politics involves charges that regularly 
were thrown at the Bush White House accusing the Administration of 
distorting scientific facts to serve political goals.35 Regardless of whether or not 
the Bush Administration deliberately sought to subvert science, the mere 
frequency of such allegations helps to highlight how the current demand for 
technical, scientific, or expert-driven explanations from agencies may well 
cause agencies to feel pressure to align facts and science with political goals. 
In exploring the appropriate place of politics in administrative rulemaking, 
this Article proceeds in four parts. Part I is descriptive. It describes how courts, 
agencies, and scholars today generally assume that agency decisions made in 
the rulemaking context must speak in expert-based terms, not political terms, 
in order to meet the reason-giving requirement of arbitrary and capricious 
review. 
Part II makes the normative case for change. Specifically, Part II sets forth 
four major benefits that would flow from altering modern day conceptions of 
arbitrary and capricious review in order to give certain political influences an 
accepted and transparent place in agency rulemaking. First, although some 
major administrative law doctrines reflect a shift from an expert-based model 
of agency decisionmaking to a politically-based model, hard look review has 
 
32.  Id. 
33.  See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354 
(proposed July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1). 
34.  See Juliet Eilperin, EPA Says Emissions Are Threat to Public, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 2009, at 
A1. 
35.  See Juliet Eilperin, Putting Some Heat on Bush: Scientist Inspires Anger, Awe for Challenges on 
Global Warming, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2005, at A17; Jeremy Symons, Op-Ed., How Bush and 
Co. Obscure the Science, WASH. POST, July 13, 2003, at B4; see also infra notes 175-179 and 
accompanying text (describing charges levied against the Bush Administration accusing it of 
distorting science to serve political goals). 
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failed to reflect this change. Allowing agencies to disclose political influences 
and enabling courts to credit openly political judgments would help to bring 
hard look review, which currently hinges on an outmoded model of “expert” 
decisionmaking, into harmony with other major doctrines, such as Chevron 
deference,36 which seem to embrace the newer political control model. Second, 
encouraging agencies to disclose political factors could help to take some of the 
pressure off of science, creating a more effective separation between science and 
politics. Third, embracing a proper role for politics could give courts yet 
another reason to defer to agencies, thereby offering a means of softening the 
“ossification” charge frequently raised against arbitrary and capricious review. 
Fourth, encouraging agencies to disclose political factors rather than hiding 
behind technocratic façades would enable political influences to come out into 
the open, thereby enabling greater political accountability. 
Part III considers the specific mechanics of how such a change might occur, 
analyzing as a doctrinal matter when arbitrary and capricious review could 
most appropriately embrace political considerations. In particular, Part III 
looks at four questions. First, when can statutes be read as signaling Congress’s 
intent to allow or to disallow agency reliance upon political influences? Second, 
assuming that a particular congressional statute has not prohibited an agency 
from relying upon political influences altogether, what specific types of 
political influences should be allowed to justify agency action? Third, who 
stands as a potential source of legitimate political influence? Fourth, what 
specific types of rulemaking decisions might most appropriately be influenced 
by politics? 
Finally, Part IV addresses five potential hurdles that could stand in the way 
of providing politics with a place. The first obstacle discussed in Part IV can be 
called the “first-mover” dilemma: agencies may be reluctant to rely upon 
political factors without knowing ahead of time whether courts will accept 
them, yet courts may lack incentives to send signals to agencies indicating in 
the abstract their willingness to consider political factors if agencies have yet to 
rely openly upon such factors. A second potential objection is whether the 
“carrot” offered to agencies by this Article’s proposal needs to be balanced by a 
“stick” that would punish agencies when they rely upon political influences but 
fail to fess up to such reliance. A third potential obstacle involves whether 
courts realistically can be expected to embrace politics in the regulatory regime, 
or whether courts’ own discomfort with politics will likely lead them to 
continue to insist on agency decisions explained in technocratic terms. A fourth 
possible objection is whether giving politics a place in rulemaking would 
unduly undermine separation of powers principles. Finally, a fifth objection 
 
36.  See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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involves the potential difficulty of asking courts to review political influences 
that may be ill-suited to legal restraint. Ultimately, Part IV concludes that none 
of these hurdles is insurmountable. 
i .  a focus on expert,  not politicized,  agency 
decisionmaking 
When agencies engage in rulemaking today, they face a number of legal 
constraints that check their decisionmaking process: agencies’ factual findings 
must be supported by the evidence,37 their legal conclusions must be consistent 
with relevant constitutional and statutory provisions,38 and the reasons 
agencies give to support their decisions must be adequate.39 This last 
requirement—a “reason-giving” requirement that demands that agencies 
adequately explain their decisions—stems from section 706(2)(A) of the APA, 
which instructs courts to set aside agency action found to be “arbitrary” or 
“capricious.”40 
As this Part describes, courts, agencies, and scholars today generally read 
the reason-giving requirement that flows from arbitrary and capricious review 
as demanding that agencies justify their decisions in expert-driven or statutory 
terms. Courts applying arbitrary and capricious review, accordingly, search for 
technocratic decisionmaking.41 Agencies—likely taking a cue from the 
judiciary’s preference for expert-based decisionmaking—routinely accompany 
their newly promulgated rules with detailed and lengthy discussions of the 
relevant statute, the data, the methods of reasoning, and responses to 
comments received.42 And scholars too generally seem to embrace agencies’ 
reason-giving duty as a means of forcing expert-based decisionmaking.43 
 
37.  See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E) (2006). 
38.  See id. § 706(2)(B)-(C). 
39.  See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
40.  Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (instructing reviewing courts to “hold 
unlawful . . . agency action . . . found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise not in accordance with law”). 
41.  See infra Section I.A. 
42.  See PIERCE, supra note 2, at 82; see also infra Section I.B. (discussing the judiciary’s demand 
for expert-based decisionmaking). 
43.  See infra Section I.C. 
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A. The Judiciary’s Search for Expert-Based Decisionmaking 
The judiciary’s application of arbitrary and capricious review has “changed 
dramatically” over time.44 Initially, before the passage of the APA, the Supreme 
Court likened agencies to legislatures for purposes of judicial review45 and 
indicated that only very minimal judicial review—akin to mere rationality 
review—would be applied.46 Hence, courts would not find an agency rule to be 
arbitrary so long as “any state of facts reasonably [could] be conceived that 
would sustain it.”47 As Professor Richard Pierce has explained, under this 
formulation of arbitrariness review, “an agency needed no evidence, no record, 
and no statement of reasons to support a rule; rules were rarely challenged; 
and challenges were rarely successful.”48 
After the APA was enacted in 1946, things did not change much. The APA’s 
text did require that agencies include with their notice-and-comment rules a 
“concise . . . statement of . . . basis and purpose,”49 thereby providing courts 
with a basis for striking down agency rules as arbitrary or capricious under 
section 706(2)(A) of the APA. However, even after the APA’s passage, agencies 
continued to receive an “extraordinary level of deference.”50 
It was not until the 1960s and 1970s that change really began in the world 
of arbitrary and capricious review. At this time, serious concerns emerged that 
agencies were being “captured” by the private interests that they regulated.51 
What had been the prevalent “expertise-based” model of agency 
decisionmaking, which viewed agencies as professional, apolitical experts 
 
44.  PIERCE, supra note 2, at 81. 
45.  See Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935). 
46.  See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 558 (4th ed. 2007); Merrick B. Garland, 
Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 532 (1985). 
47.  Pac. States Box & Basket Co., 296 U.S. at 185; see also Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 
U.S. 190, 224 (1943) (“The Regulations are assailed as ‘arbitrary and capricious.’ If this 
contention means that the Regulations are unwise, that they are not likely to succeed in 
accomplishing what the Commission intended, we can say only that the appellants have 
selected the wrong forum for such a plea.”). 
48.  PIERCE, supra note 2, at 81. 
49.  Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2006). 
50.  LAWSON, supra note 46, at 558. 
51.  Warren, supra note 1, at 2602 (noting that in 1960s and 1970s, “trust in agency experts 
evaporated” and “academics and public officials began to believe that many agencies had 
been captured by the industries and private interests that they regulated”); see also Thomas 
W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039 (1997) 
(describing capture theory); Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First 
Century, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 441 & n.17 (2003) (same). 
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charged with pursuing the public interest, began to fade away.52 In response, 
various prominent judges on the D.C. Circuit crafted a ramped up version of 
“arbitrary and capricious” review—called “hard look” review—that enabled 
courts to scrutinize agency decisions and to ensure that the public interest was 
being served.53 According to this more aggressive, less deferential version of 
arbitrary and capricious review, a court has a duty “to intervene . . . if the court 
becomes aware . . . that the agency has not really taken a ‘hard look’ at the 
salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-
making.”54 
Applying this more stringent level of review, courts began to scrutinize the 
substantive elements of agency decisions to ensure that agencies gave adequate 
consideration to the relevant data and gave reasoned explanations to support 
their decisions.55 This meant that courts expected an agency to specify in detail 
its “policy preferences, its reasoning, and its factual support” in addition to 
demonstrating that it “had responded to significant points made during the 
public comment period, had examined all relevant factors, and had considered 
significant alternatives to the course of action ultimately chosen.”56 
Given that hard look review and its fairly onerous reason-giving 
requirements stretched the traditional understanding of the APA, some 
observers thought that the Supreme Court—when presented with the right 
opportunity—would reject hard look review.57 In fact, however, in 1983 in State 
 
52.  Warren, supra note 1, at 2602. 
53.  See PIERCE, supra note 2, at 82 (describing how “[t]his new approach to judicial application 
of the arbitrary and capricious test to rules adopted through use of informal rulemaking was 
referred to as the ‘hard look’ doctrine”); see also Garland, supra note 46, at 525 (discussing 
the birth and the development of hard look doctrine); Warren, supra note 1, at 2602-03 
(describing development of hard look review). 
54.  Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Leventhal, J.). 
55.  See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods., 568 F.2d 240, 251 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)) (“Though a reviewing 
court will not match submission against counter-submission to decide whether the agency 
was correct in its conclusion on scientific matters (unless that conclusion is arbitrary), it will 
consider whether the agency has taken account of all ‘relevant factors and whether there has 
been a clear error of judgment.’”); Nat’l Ass’n of Food Chains v. ICC, 535 F.2d 1308, 1314 
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (quoting Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. 
Cir. 1970)) (“This court repeatedly has emphasized, however, that an agency must 
demonstrate that it has ‘really taken a “hard look” at the salient problems, and has . . . 
genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making.’”); Indus. Union Dep’t v. Hodgson, 499 
F.2d 467, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“What we are entitled to at all events is a careful 
identification by the Secretary, when his proposed standards are challenged, of the reasons 
why he chooses to follow one course rather than another.”). 
56.  Garland, supra note 46, at 526-27. 
57.  See PIERCE, supra note 2, at 83. 
WATTS_119_2.DOC  
proposing a place for politics 
17 
 
Farm, the Court issued an opinion that embraced the D.C. Circuit’s “hard 
look” take on arbitrary and capricious review.58 
In State Farm, the Court reviewed a decision made by the new Reagan 
Administration’s NHTSA to rescind a rule previously promulgated under the 
Carter Administration that required certain cars to be equipped with either air 
bags or automatic seat belts.59 In the Court’s opinion written by Justice White, 
the Court rejected the government’s argument that arbitrary and capricious 
review “requires no more than the minimum rationality a statute must bear in 
order to withstand analysis under the Due Process Clause.”60 Instead, the 
Court explained that although review under the arbitrary and capricious 
standard is “narrow,” an agency’s reason-giving duty under arbitrary and 
capricious review requires the agency to take a close look at the evidence, data, 
and facts before the agency: 
[T]he agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a 
satisfactory explanation for its action including a “rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice made.” In reviewing that 
explanation, we must “consider whether the decision was based on a 
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear 
error of judgment.” Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and 
capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not 
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect 
of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter 
to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be 
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.61 
Applying this standard, the Court ultimately concluded that the NHTSA 
had failed to adequately meet its duty of reasoned decisionmaking. Specifically, 
the Court held that the NHTSA had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 
rescinding the passive restraint requirement because—although the agency 
claimed that automatic detachable seat belts would not attain anticipated safety 
benefits—the agency had failed to consider the possibility of an airbags-only 
requirement.62 The majority also concluded that the agency had failed to 
 
58.  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
59.  Id. 
60.  Id. at 43 n.9. 
61.  Id. at 43 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
62.  Id. at 46-48 (noting that the ineffectiveness of one safety mechanism “does not cast doubt 
on the need for a passive restraint standard or upon the efficacy of airbag technology”); see 
also id. at 46 (“There was no suggestion in the long rulemaking process . . . that if only one 
of these options were feasible, no passive restraint standard should be promulgated.”). 
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adequately justify its decision to dismiss the safety benefits of automatic 
detachable seat belts.63 
Then-Justice Rehnquist, joined by three others, wrote a separate opinion 
concurring in part and dissenting in part. He agreed with the majority that the 
agency had failed to explain why it rescinded the airbag requirement and 
concurred in that portion of the majority’s opinion. However, he disagreed 
with the majority’s conclusion that the NHTSA’s “view of detachable 
automatic seat belts was arbitrary and capricious.”64 He accepted the agency’s 
conclusion (based primarily on logic and on the agency’s dismissal of the 
relevance of a study) that any safety benefits would be small because of the 
likelihood that users would detach the belts and not reattach them.65 
At the end of his opinion, Rehnquist proceeded to provide a possible 
explanation of what was really going on in the case—an explanation related to 
politics.66 Specifically, Rehnquist wrote: 
The agency’s changed view of the standard seems to be related to the 
election of a new President of a different political party. It is readily 
apparent that the responsible members of one administration may 
consider public resistance and uncertainties to be more important than 
do their counterparts in a previous administration. A change in 
administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a 
perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the 
costs and benefits of its programs and regulations. As long as the 
agency remains within the bounds established by Congress, it is 
entitled to assess administrative records and evaluate priorities in light 
of the philosophy of the administration.67 
Rehnquist’s acceptance of the agency’s rescission of the detachable belt 
portion of the standard did not ultimately hinge on this political explanation. 
Nor did Rehnquist’s opinion suggest that politics alone could be treated as a 
 
63.  Id. at 53-55. 
64.  Id. at 58 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
65.  Id. 
66.  Id. at 59. The lower court in State Farm also noted the political context of the NHTSA’s 
decision. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Dep’t of Transp., 680 F.2d 206, 213 (D.C. Cir. 
1982) (noting that the NHTSA’s proposal of the possible rescission was “announced by the 
White House Press Office on April 6, 1981, as part of a larger package of economic recovery 
measures”); see also id. at 240 n.44 (noting that “notice of rulemaking to rescind [the] 
standard was based at least in part on economic problems of the automobile industry, and 
was announced by [the] White House in Actions to Help the U.S. Auto Industry”). 
67.  State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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sufficient justification for the agency’s decision. Yet Rehnquist clearly did 
embrace the notion that political influences might reasonably act as a legitimate 
pressure on an agency’s policymaking process, so long as the agency remains 
within the boundaries set by Congress in the relevant statutory scheme. 
The Court did not respond to Rehnquist’s points about the political 
context of the decision. In fact, the Court’s decision skipped over the political 
context altogether, focusing on the agency’s technocratic justifications for the 
rule rescission instead.68 Most likely this was because the NHTSA itself did not 
openly acknowledge that political factors had influenced its decision. Thus, the 
Court’s focus on the evidence and facts before the agency (and its silence on the 
issue of politics) likely was not meant to signal the Court’s affirmative rejection 
of Rehnquist’s embrace of politics. Instead, the Court’s silence on the issue 
most likely was simply a reflection of the fact that the agency and the litigants 
had not teed up the issue.69 Nonetheless, the opinion has been widely read 
over time to represent the triumph of expertise to the exclusion of politics.70 
Ever since State Farm, courts engaging in arbitrary and capricious review 
routinely have demanded more than mere minimum rationality, and they have 
searched agency decisions to ensure they represent expert-driven, technocratic 
decisionmaking.71 
Decisions from the D.C. Circuit, which is by far the most important court 
in the country when it comes to federal administrative law,72 help to illustrate 
how prevalent State Farm’s focus on evidence, facts, and expertise has become. 
Opinions from the D.C. Circuit do not expressly reject political considerations 
but they repeatedly borrow from State Farm’s language, framing arbitrary and 
capricious review in expert-driven terms and asking whether the agency 
“offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before 
 
68.  See id. at 46-57 (majority opinion); see also Herz, supra note 8, at 310 (“Justice White did not 
contradict Justice Rehnquist’s description of the political setting or conclude that it was 
outweighed by other factors. Rather, he ignored it altogether, implicitly deeming the politics 
of the rescission simply irrelevant.”). 
69.  Compare EDLEY, supra note 4, at 63-66 (arguing that State Farm misidentified the decision-
making “paradigm as science rather than politics”), with Stephen F. Williams, The Roots of 
Deference, 100 YALE L.J. 1103, 1107-08 (1991) (reviewing EDLEY, supra note 4) (arguing that 
the Court in State Farm did not identify science instead of politics as the decision-making 
paradigm but rather that the agency and the litigants did). 
70.  See EDLEY, supra note 4, at 183; MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 4, at 226; Herz, supra note 8, 
at 310-11; Kagan, supra note 4, at 2380-81; Stack, supra note 4, at 307 n.191. 
71.  See Kagan, supra note 4, at 2270 (noting that courts require “that agency action bear the 
indicia of essentially apolitical, ‘expert’ process and judgment”); see also supra note 4 and 
accompanying text (discussing courts’ demand for expert-based decisionmaking). 
72.  See LAWSON, supra note 46, at 244. 
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the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in 
view or the product of agency expertise.”73 Other courts are no different. They 
too, although generally not expressly ruling out political considerations, have 
ruled out politics by inference, routinely asking whether the agency’s decision 
is adequately explained in light of the statute, the evidence and facts before the 
agency, or the agency’s expertise.74 
Only one recent arbitrary and capricious case from the circuit courts—a 
concurring opinion issued in UAW v. Chao75—represents a significant 
departure from the judiciary’s singular focus on law, facts, and expertise.76 In 
Chao, the Third Circuit reviewed OSHA’s 2003 denial of a rulemaking petition 
filed in 1993 asking it to promulgate a rule that would have established a 
standard for occupational exposure to metalworking fluids. Although OSHA’s 
ultimate decision (made during the Bush Administration) to deny the petition 
seemed inconsistent with the agency’s prior 1995 decision (made during the 
Clinton Administration) to designate metalworking fluids as a high agency 
priority, the Third Circuit upheld the denial of the petition. The court stressed 
that OSHA’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious because OSHA 
“weighed the scientific evidence of health hazards . . . against its other 
regulatory priorities” and “identified the reasons why regulating . . . [would] 
require an ‘enormous’ allocation of resources.”77 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Pollak agreed with the majority but 
explained that he would acknowledge what was really at stake in the case: 
 
73.  Wedgewood Vill. Pharmacy v. DEA, 509 F.3d 541, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (emphasis added) 
(internal quotations omitted); see also Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165, 177 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(“[W]e must satisfy ourselves that the agency examine[d] the relevant data and 
articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between 
the facts found and the choice made.”) (internal citations omitted). 
74.  See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1193 
(9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 
29, 43 (1983)); CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167, 174 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)), judgment vacated by FCC 
v. CBS Corp., 129 S. Ct. 2176 (2009). 
75.  361 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2004). 
76.  Portions of a dissenting opinion written by Judge Kozinski in 2006 also suggest that Judge 
Kozinski might be inclined, at least in the inaction context, to allow agencies to decide not to 
adopt regulations for political reasons, such as a change in administrations. See Animal 
Legal Def. Fund v. Veneman, 469 F.3d 826, 850 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting), vacated, 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007). However, rather than suggesting that 
such political factors be embraced by arbitrary and capricious review, Judge Kozinski 
suggests that the presence of political, nonlegal justifications for agency inaction are a reason 
to apply a rule of nonreviewability to agency inaction. See id. at 850. 
77.  Chao, 361 F.3d at 255. 
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“[W]hat is at issue in this case is a change in regulatory policy coincident with 
a change in administration.”78 Citing Rehnquist’s opinion in State Farm, Judge 
Pollak noted that “[t]here is nothing obscure, and nothing suspect, about” a 
change in regulatory priorities that coincides with a change in administration.79 
Rather, he said that this is “one of the important things that elections are 
about.”80 
Consistent with State Farm and with the judiciary’s overall willingness to 
turn a blind eye to the role political influences actually do play in agency 
decisionmaking processes, the majority in Chao said nothing about Judge 
Pollak’s reliance on the political context of the agency’s decision. Thus, in 
contrast to Judge Pollak’s views, the majority opinion in Chao simply serves to 
underscore the judiciary’s widespread practice of demanding that agency 
decisions be explained in expert-driven or legal terms, not political terms. 
One of the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncements of note involving 
arbitrary and capricious review, Massachusetts v. EPA,81 should only help to 
solidify the judiciary’s overall willingness to demand technocratic 
decisionmaking. In Massachusetts, the Court reviewed the EPA’s denial of a 
rulemaking petition that asked the EPA to regulate certain emissions from new 
motor vehicles that lead to global warming.82 Justice Stevens’s opinion for a 
five-Justice majority held that the EPA has the statutory authority to regulate 
such emissions and that the various policy-driven reasons the EPA offered for 
declining to regulate, ranging from a desire to avoid piecemeal regulation to a 
desire to avoid interfering with the President’s foreign policy initiatives, were 
not sufficient reasons for denying the rulemaking petition.83 Thus, the Court 
ultimately sent the EPA back to the drawing board, embracing an expertise-
driven notion of agency decisionmaking akin to what the Court previously 
embraced in State Farm.84 Essentially, the Court told the EPA that it wanted to 
see the “expert” agency do the work and make a scientific determination of 
whether the emissions do or do not endanger the public health or welfare 
 
78.  Id. at 256 (Pollak, J., concurring). 
79.  Id. at 256 & n.1.  
80.  Id. 
81.  549 U.S. 497 (2007). In Massachusetts, the Court did not apply the APA but rather applied a 
specific provision of the Clean Air Act (CAA) that closely tracks section 706(2)(A) of the 
APA. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9) (2000) (calling for reversal of action “found to be . . . 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”). 
82.  Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 513. 
83.  Id. at 533. 
84.  See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 54 (arguing that Massachusetts could be 
considered “State Farm for a new generation”) (citation omitted). 
WATTS_119_2.DOC  
the yale law journal 119:2   2009  
22 
 
within the meaning of the statute. Policy-driven considerations were to factor 
into the agency decision to regulate or not to regulate, if at all, only after the 
expert agency did the technical work and made an expert judgment.85 
As Professors Vermeule and Freeman have argued, the Court’s focus in 
Massachusetts on agency expertise embraces a type of “expertise-forcing” 
whereby the Court sought to “protect administrative expertise from political 
intrusion” by forcing agencies to engage in expert-driven decisionmaking.86 In 
this sense, Massachusetts loudly reiterates the message that State Farm has been 
read to have established more than twenty years earlier: agencies must justify 
their decisions in expert-driven, not political, terms if they wish to convince 
courts that reasoned decisionmaking has occurred. 
Just this past Term, however, the Court issued a notable decision involving 
arbitrary and capricious review, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,87 that does 
not seem to neatly fit within Massachusetts’s and State Farm’s technocratic 
lenses. In Fox, the Court reviewed orders issued by the FCC upholding 
indecency findings for the isolated utterances of the F- and S-words during 
television broadcasts. The FCC’s decision that fleeting expletives can be 
actionable marked a change in the FCC’s policy—a change that Justice Scalia 
frankly acknowledged was “spurred by significant political pressure from 
Congress.”88 In upholding the FCC’s orders, Justice Scalia’s opinion for the 
Court emphatically rejected the notion that all shifts in agency policy are 
subject to more rigorous judicial review,89 and hence his opinion seems to 
make it easier for agencies to change their policies due to changes in the 
political landscape.90 In this sense, Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court at least 
implicitly seems to cast doubt on a technocratic approach.91 In contrast, in his 
dissenting opinion in Fox, Justice Breyer joined by Justices Stevens and 
 
85.  Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J. Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking New Ground on 
Issues Other Than Global Warming, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1029, 1043 (2008). 
86.  Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 54, 64-65. 
87.  129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). 
88.  Id. at 1816. Justice Scalia was joined in this Part of the opinion only by Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justices Thomas and Alito—not by Justice Kennedy. 
89.  Id. at 1810 (“We find no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act or in our opinions for a 
requirement that all agency change be subjected to more searching review.”). 
90.  Id. 
91.  Id. at 1810-11. This part of Justice Scalia’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito. Another portion of Justice Scalia’s opinion, which was 
not joined by Justice Kennedy, implies even more strongly that political explanations may 
be enough to justify agency action: “If the FCC is indeed an agent of Congress, it would 
seem an adequate explanation of its change of position that Congress made clear its wishes 
for stricter enforcement.” Id. at 1816 (internal citations omitted). 
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Ginsburg and then-Justice Souter expressed discomfort with allowing political 
influences to factor into agency decisionmaking, arguing that existing law does 
not permit the FCC to “make policy choices for purely political reasons.”92 The 
Court’s divided opinion in Fox, accordingly, might suggest that some cracks 
are forming in the foundation holding up the technocratic model despite the 
judiciary’s longstanding pattern of demanding technocratic decisionmaking. 
B. Agencies’ Focus on Technocratic Factors 
Given that courts generally apply arbitrary and capricious review in a way 
that calls on agencies to justify their decisions in technocratic terms, it should 
come as no surprise that agencies today generally couch their decisions in 
technocratic, statutory, or scientific language, either failing to disclose or 
affirmatively hiding political influences that factor into the mix. Numerous 
examples of this can be found in recent rulemaking proceedings.93 
Take, for example, the FDA’s controversial attempt in the 1990s to regulate 
teen smoking. President Clinton played a very active role in directing the 
rulemaking. He personally announced the initiation of the rulemaking at a 
press conference, publicly stating: “[T]oday I am authorizing the Food and 
Drug Administration to initiate a broad series of steps all designed to stop sales 
and marketing of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco to children.”94 He also 
subsequently announced the final rule in a Rose Garden ceremony where he 
noted that the rule being announced was “the right thing to do, scientifically, 
legally, and morally.”95 Yet the detailed and lengthy statement of basis and 
purpose supporting the FDA’s final rule relied upon statutory, scientific, and 
expert justifications—barely even hinting at President Clinton’s significant 
 
92.  Id. at 1829 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
93.  See generally Strauss, supra note 10, at 966-67 (describing agencies’ failure to disclose 
political influences in certain rulemaking proceedings). 
94.  See The President’s News Conference, II PUB. PAPERS 1237 (Aug. 10, 1995) (announcing that 
“by executive authority, I will restrict sharply the advertising, promotion, distribution, and 
marketing of cigarettes to teenagers”). 
95.  See Remarks Announcing the Final Rule To Protect Youth from Tobacco, II PUB. PAPERS 
1332, 1333 (Aug. 23, 1996) (“A year ago this month, we launched a comprehensive strategy to 
kick tobacco out of the lives of our children. We proposed strong restrictions on advertising, 
marketing, and sales of cigarettes to children. In the year that followed, the FDA received a 
torrent of comments from the public, more than 700,000, by far the largest outpouring of 
public response in the FDA’s history. The FDA has heard from doctors, scientists, tobacco 
companies, and tens of thousands of children. We have carefully considered the evidence.”). 
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involvement in the rulemaking.96 Thus, as Professor Peter Strauss has noted, 
“[a] person who had not been reading newspapers or listening to presidential 
speeches” would have seen “only an ordinary (if high-visibility) agency rule, 
adopted and defended in the ordinary manner” and would not have seen 
evidence of the President’s active and open political involvement.97 Likewise, a 
court limiting its review to the rulemaking record would have seen only “a 
quite ordinary collection of documents and voluminous explanations of expert 
judgment.”98 
Another example of an agency’s failure to disclose political influences in the 
course of a rulemaking can be found in the EPA’s lowering of the reporting 
thresholds for certain persistent, bioaccumulative, toxic (PBT) chemicals.99 In 
connection with Earth Day in April 1998, Vice President Gore directed the EPA 
to list and lower the reporting thresholds for PBT chemicals reported under 
section 313 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act.100 
In accordance with Vice President Gore’s directions, the EPA went ahead and 
promulgated a rule in 1999 that, among other things, lowered the reporting 
thresholds for certain PBTs.101 Yet the EPA’s statement of basis and purpose 
 
96.  See Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco 
To Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396 (Aug. 28, 1996). One brief and 
fleeting reference to the President’s involvement can be found in the FDA’s response to a 
comment raising concern that the FDA’s real goal was to achieve an outright ban on 
tobacco. See id. at 44,419 (noting that “when the President announced the proposed FDA 
regulations on August 10, 1995, one reporter asked whether an outright ban would be more 
logical than a ‘regulatory partial step’” and the President replied by stating that he thought 
“it would be wrong to ban cigarettes outright”). 
97.  Strauss, supra note 10, at 967; see also Kagan, supra note 4, at 2283 (“The final documents, 
containing new proscriptions on tobacco manufacturers and vendors, a statement of the 
health-related justifications for those proscriptions, and a lengthy defense of FDA 
jurisdiction over the issue, nowhere mentioned the President; rules, as a historic matter, 
very rarely have done so, and this one was no exception.”). 
98.  Strauss, supra note 10, at 967 (emphasis added). 
99.  Persistent Bioaccumulative Toxic (PBT) Chemicals, 64 Fed. Reg. 58,666 (Oct. 29, 1999). 
100.  See EPA Statement of Regulatory and Deregulatory Priorities, 65 Fed. Reg. 73,453, 73,460 
(Nov. 30, 2000) (noting that the initiative was “announced by the Vice President on EPA’s 
Earth Day 1998 in response to the finding that most commercial chemicals have very little, if 
any, publicly available toxicity information on which to make sound judgments about 
potential risks”); id. at 73,458 (“The Chemical Right-to-Know Initiative, which was 
announced by the Vice President in April 1998, included a directive to the Agency to list and 
lower the reporting thresholds for persistent, bioaccumulative, toxic (PBT) chemicals reported 
under section 313 of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act.”) 
(emphasis added). 
101.  See Persistent Bioaccumulative Toxic (PBT) Chemicals, 64 Fed. Reg. 58,666; see also EPA 
Statement of Regulatory and Deregulatory Priorities, 65 Fed. Reg. at 73,458 (“In accord with 
the Vice President’s directive, EPA has set out the criteria that will be used for determining if 
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accompanying the final rule says nothing about influences from the executive 
branch generally or the Vice President more specifically.102 Rather, the EPA’s 
document announcing the final rule speaks entirely in statutory and scientific 
terms. 
The EPA’s silence about Vice President Gore’s involvement is particularly 
interesting when the EPA’s 1999 rule is contrasted with the agency’s 
November 2000 regulatory plan published in the Unified Agenda. In the 
November 2000 Unified Agenda, in the course of disclosing another proposed 
rule involving PBTs that was on the agency’s agenda at the time, the EPA 
noted that it previously promulgated the 1999 rule lowering the reporting 
thresholds “[i]n accord with the Vice President’s directive.”103 One could 
speculate that the EPA included this reference to political influence in its 
November 2000 description of its regulatory plan—but not in the actual 
statement of basis and purpose accompanying the 1999 rule—because the point 
of the regulatory plan is to speak directly to the executive branch: the plan seeks 
to demonstrate to the executive branch that the agency’s rulemaking priorities 
and agenda are consistent with presidential priorities.104 In contrast, a notice of 
a final rule could be thought of as speaking to interested parties and to the courts 
in that it aims to justify the validity of that particular rule in terms sufficient to 
stave off or to withstand judicial challenge and perhaps also to win a broader 
public relations battle. 
The two examples just given—the high-profile tobacco rulemaking and the 
lower-profile rulemaking involving PBT chemicals—both involved the Clinton 
Administration. Examples of agencies’ failures to disclose political factors 
influencing their rulemaking proceedings, however, are not limited to the 
Clinton Administration. Rather, the same pattern persisted during the recent 
Bush presidency as well. One representative example from the Bush presidency 
involves a rulemaking conducted by the Department of Health & Human 
Services (HHS). Shortly after President Bush entered the White House, he 
 
a chemical is persistent and bioaccumulative under EPCRA section 313 and has lowered the 
EPCRA section 313 reporting thresholds.”). 
102.  See Persistent Bioaccumulative Toxic (PBT) Chemicals, 64 Fed. Reg. 58,666. 
103.  EPA Statement of Regulatory and Deregulatory Priorities, 65 Fed. Reg. at 73,458. 
104.  See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 4(b), (c), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,738 (Oct. 4, 1993) (requiring 
federal agencies to prepare a “unified regulatory agenda” and “regulatory plan” for 
submission to OIRA); see also id. § 4(c)(5), 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,739 (“If the Administrator of 
OIRA believes that a planned regulatory action of an agency may be inconsistent with the 
President’s priorities or the principles set forth in this Executive order or may be in conflict 
with any policy or action taken or planned by another agency, the Administrator of OIRA 
shall promptly notify, in writing, the affected agencies, the Advisors, and the Vice 
President.”). 
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publicly issued a written statement concerning federal regulations involving 
the privacy of medical records.105 In his public statement, President Bush noted 
that he had directed the Secretary of HHS to allow the medical privacy rules 
that had been crafted during the Clinton Administration to become effective, 
but he also noted that—in light of “legitimate concerns” about the rule—he had 
asked the Secretary “to recommend appropriate modifications to the rule.”106 
In the wake of this public directive from the President, the Secretary directed 
HHS to propose appropriate changes to the privacy rules, which HHS 
ultimately did on March 27, 2002.107 The proposed changes to the rules were 
published in August 2002 and went into effect October 15, 2002.108 Notably, 
however, the final rulemaking document includes only statutory and 
technocratic justifications for the rule changes; it does not even so much as 
mention President Bush’s public statement directing modification of the 
rules.109 Thus, HHS’s rulemaking follows the clear pattern that can be seen in 
agency rulemakings as a whole: a focus on traditional statutory, scientific, or 
technocratic terms and a failure to transparently disclose political influences. 
There are, however, a few recent agency decisions that seem to buck this 
general trend, serving as “exceptions” to the general rule. One very recent 
exception involves fuel economy standards for model year 2011 passenger cars 
and light trucks issued by the Department of Transportation (DOT) under the 
Obama Administration.110 During the Bush Administration, the NHTSA under 
the DOT issued proposed rules to address fuel efficiency standards for model 
years 2011 through 2015. However, on January 7, 2009, right at the end of 
Bush’s presidency, the DOT issued a statement explaining that the fuel 
efficiency standards would not be finalized under the Bush Administration 
because “[t]he recent financial difficulties of the automobile industry will 
require the next administration to conduct a thorough review of matters 
affecting the industry, including how to effectively implement the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA).”111 Just days after being sworn 
 
105.  Statement on Federal Regulations on Privacy of Medical Records, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 611 (Apr. 12, 2001). 
106.  Id. at 612. 
107.  Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182, 
53,183 (Aug. 14, 2002). 
108.  Id. at 53,182. 
109.  Id. 
110.  See Average Fuel Economy Standards Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Model Year 2011, 74 
Fed. Reg. 14,196 (Mar. 30, 2009). 
111.  Id. at 14,199 (quoting Statement from the U.S. Department of Transportation, available at 
http://www.dot.gov/affairs/dot0109.htm). 
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into office in January 2009, President Obama—following through on a 
campaign promise to promote energy efficiency—brought the issue back to life 
by issuing a memorandum directing the DOT to quickly finalize standards for 
model year 2011 and to establish standards for subsequent model years via a 
separate rulemaking.112 The President publicly announced this directive at the 
White House while flanked by the head of the DOT, as well as other key 
members of his energy and environment teams.113 
The NHTSA quickly followed President Obama’s directions, issuing final 
standards for model year 2011 in March 2009 and postponing decision on 
subsequent model years. Most significant for purposes of this Article is the fact 
that the NHTSA’s final rule adopting the 2011 standards repeatedly references 
the President’s directions and preferences, thereby giving the clear impression 
that the President had exerted significant influence over the agency’s decision. 
For example, the NHTSA noted in the summary of its action that “the 
President issued a memorandum on January 26, 2009” in the “context of his 
calls for the development of new national policies to prompt sustained 
domestic and international actions to address the closely intertwined issues of 
energy independence, energy security and climate change.”114 The NHTSA also 
explained that it was deferring action on standards for the later model years so 
as to ensure that it will select standards that contribute “to the maximum 
extent possible within [statutory limits], to meeting the energy and 
environmental challenges and goals outlined by the President.”115 
Another exception to agencies’ general failure to disclose political influences 
involves the withdrawal of a rule initially proposed in 1989 by the Mine Safety 
and Health Administration (MSHA). The proposed rule would have, among 
other things, established “permissible exposure limits” for substances that 
might adversely affect the health of miners.116 In September 2002, the MSHA 
decided to withdraw portions of the proposed rule from its agenda,117 
explaining in a cursory fashion that its decision to withdraw the proposed rule 
 
112.  See id.; see also John M. Broder & Peter Baker, Obama’s Order Likely To Tighten Auto 
Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009, at A1. 
113.  See Steven Mufson & Juliet Eilperin, Obama Issues Orders Toward More Fuel-Efficient Cars, 
WASH. POST., Jan. 27, 2009, at A4. 
114.  Average Fuel Economy Standards Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Model Year 2011, 74 
Fed. Reg. 14,196. 
115.  Id. 
116.  Air Quality, Chemical Substances, and Respiratory Protection Standards, 54 Fed. Reg. 
35,760 (proposed Aug. 29, 1989). 
117.  Air Quality, Chemical Substances, and Respiratory Protection Standards, 67 Fed. Reg. 
60,611 (Sept. 26, 2002). 
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“was the result of changes in agency priorities” and the possible adverse effect 
of an appellate court decision. The MSHA also explained that it had been 
“more than 13 years since the proposal was published and more than 12 years 
since the comments were received” and that the record was stale.118 
The MSHA’s rulemaking withdrawal ultimately faced a judicial challenge, 
and the D.C. Circuit concluded that the agency had failed to provide a 
sufficient explanation justifying the withdrawal.119 On remand, the MSHA 
published a detailed explanation of its rule withdrawal, elaborating on why its 
statutory responsibilities, the change in agency priorities, and the staleness of 
the rulemaking record all called for withdrawal. On the issue of changing 
agency priorities, the MSHA stressed that the Secretary of Labor had revisited 
and reprioritized the agency’s agenda consistent with a “federal agency-wide 
initiative intended to maintain sound regulatory practice,” which was 
announced by President Bush’s Chief of Staff Andrew Card in a written 
memorandum to agency heads.120 Notably, in justifying why this politically 
driven reprioritization should count as an “adequate” explanation for its 
decision, the MSHA drew directly from the views Judge Pollak set forth in 
Chao just one year earlier: “‘[T]here is nothing obscure, and nothing suspect 
about regulatory policy changes coincident with changes in administration,’” 
the MSHA explained, quoting from Judge Pollak.121 “[E]ach administration 
embraces its own priority-setting process and regulatory philosophy such that 
items considered priority by one administration may not be so by another 
administration.”122 
Although the MSHA’s explanation of the rule withdrawal provides a very 
good example of how agencies are in fact influenced by political factors and 
how they could disclose such influences, the MSHA’s acknowledgement of 
politics in its rulemaking—just like the NHTSA’s references to Obama’s 
 
118.  Id. 
119.  See Int’l Union, United Mine Workers v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 358 F.3d 40, 44 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (concluding, among other things, that the “MSHA’s statement that there was a 
‘change in agency priorities,’ without explanation, is not informative in the least”). 
120.  See Air Quality, Chemical Substances, and Respiratory Protection Standards, 69 Fed. Reg. 
67,681, 67,686 (Nov. 19, 2004) (citing Memorandum from Andrew H. Card, Jr., Assistant 
to the President and Chief of Staff, to Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments 
and Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 7702 (Jan. 24, 2001)). 
121.  Id. (citing UAW v. Chao, 361 F.3d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2004) (Pollak, J., concurring)). 
122.  Air Quality, Chemical Substances, and Respiratory Protection Standards, 69 Fed. Reg. at 
67,686. 
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influence in its 2009 fuel efficiency rulemaking—stand as exceptions, not the 
norm. Generally agencies sweep political influences under the rug.123 
C. Scholars’ Acceptance of the Push for Expertise 
Like courts and agencies, scholars too have spent insufficient time 
considering whether politics and arbitrary and capricious review could work 
together. This is not due to a lack of scholarly interest in hard look review in 
general. To the contrary, scholars have spent inordinate amounts of time 
debating hard look review and criticizing it on a variety of grounds. For 
example, many scholars have attacked hard look review on the ground that it 
has “ossified” the rulemaking process by making informal rulemaking 
burdensome and expensive and by pushing agencies to use other tools to set 
regulatory policies.124 In addition, some scholars have argued that intrusive 
arbitrary and capricious review is inconsistent with the minimal procedural 
requirements imposed by the APA as interpreted by the Supreme Court in the 
seminal case of Vermont Yankee.125 Notably absent from this scholarship, 
 
123.  A draft of a work by Professor Nina Mendelson corroborates this conclusion, documenting 
in detail how “public information about executive supervision” of agency decisions is 
“surprisingly rare” despite the frequency with which presidents direct “agencies to take 
action of one sort or another, including the promulgation of rules.” Nina A. Mendelson, 
Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decisionmaking, 108 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2010) (manuscript at 24, on file with The Yale Law Journal), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1470850.  
124.  See William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review 
Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability To Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal 
Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 395 (2000) (summarizing ossification arguments made 
by opponents of hard look review); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in 
Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1264 (1989) (“There 
is mounting evidence that fear of judicial rejection of a policy based on the requirement of 
reasoned decisionmaking has introduced into the policymaking process delay and resource 
commitments so great that some agencies have abandoned their efforts at policymaking 
completely.”); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals To 
Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 483 (1997) 
(“Articles lamenting the recent ‘ossification’ of notice and comment rulemaking seem to be 
the fashion in administrative law scholarship today.”). 
125.  In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 
(1978), the Supreme Court admonished courts for piling additional procedures on top of the 
minimal procedures for notice-and-comment rulemaking set out in the APA. For examples 
of scholarly works arguing that the judiciary’s formulation of hard look could be read to 
violate Vermont Yankee’s command, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Waiting for Vermont Yankee 
III, IV, and V? A Response to Beermann and Lawson, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 902, 904-10 
(2007); and Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking: Waiting for Vermont 
Yankee II, 55 TUL. L. REV. 418 (1981). For a contrary view, see Jack M. Beermann & Gary 
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however, has been much critical analysis of how hard look review currently 
embraces expertise to the exclusion of politics and incentivizes agencies to 
speak only in technocratic terms. Indeed, many scholars seem to accept the 
desirability of our current system’s focus on expertise and science. 
Take, for example, Professors Vermeule and Freeman’s recent article, 
which describes how the Court’s decision in Massachusetts embraces a notion of 
“expertise-forcing” that attempts to ensure that agencies exercise expert 
judgment free from political pressures.126 In describing the Court’s embrace of 
“expertise-forcing,” Professors Vermeule and Freeman speak in a decidedly 
positive light about the judiciary’s attempt to insulate administrative expertise 
from political influence.127 
Other scholars have spoken affirmatively about the virtues of expertise and 
insulation and the negative aspects of politics as well. Justice Stephen Breyer, 
who has co-authored a prominent administrative law casebook,128 is one of 
these scholars. Justice Breyer, for example, has argued that “[a] depoliticized 
regulatory process might produce better results, hence increased confidence, 
leading to more favorable public and Congressional reactions” and that elite, 
professional administrators should play a larger role in regulatory 
policymaking.129 Specifically, Justice Breyer has stressed what he sees as the 
“inherent” virtues of rationalization, expertise, and insulation, which he 
believes should be distanced from politics and public opinion.130 
Given that expertise tends to be associated with positive attributes and 
politics with negative attributes,131 very little serious, sustained scholarly 
attention has been given to exploring how arbitrary and capricious review 
might be tweaked to embrace a role for politics in the agency rulemaking 
process. Two notable exceptions, however, deserve consideration: a book 
published in 1990 by then-Professor and now Dean Christopher Edley; and a 
 
Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 880-82 (2007) (arguing 
that hard look review is not necessarily inconsistent with Vermont Yankee). 
126.  Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 54, 64-67. 
127.  Id. at 54, 64-65. 
128.  See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY, at xxxvii 
(6th ed. 2006). 
129.  See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 
55-56, 59-60 (1993). 
130.  See id. at 60-63 (“[T]he group must have a degree of political insulation to withstand various 
political pressures, particularly in respect to individual substances, that emanate from the 
public directly or through Congress and other political sources.”). 
131.  See EDLEY, supra note 4, at 20-21 (describing the negative attributes often associated with 
politics as including willfulness, subjectivity, tyranny by the majority, and nonscientific 
norms). 
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law review article published by Elena Kagan, former dean of Harvard’s law 
school and currently Solicitor General of the United States.132 Both works 
address, to varying degrees of detail, the value of political judgment in 
administrative decisionmaking and how judicial doctrine might be altered to 
embrace political influences. 
Edley’s book devotes one chapter to discussing how arbitrary and 
capricious review might be read to embrace a role for politics in agency 
decisionmaking. Specifically, Edley argues that agencies should “frankly 
acknowledge the role of political, ideological, or subjective analyses in their 
reasons and findings rather than attempting to obscure those elements behind 
the filigree so readily generated by the scientific and adjudicatory fairness 
methods of decisionmaking and explanation.”133 He also argues that courts 
applying arbitrary and capricious review should police the mix and quality of 
an agency’s reliance on political factors, giving “credit [to] politics as an 
acceptable and even desirable element of decision making” in appropriate 
circumstances.134 
Kagan’s 2001 article, much like Edley’s book, represents a major scholarly 
attempt to argue for the value of political judgment in administrative 
decisionmaking generally. In the article, Kagan focuses on chronicling the 
arrival of what she calls an “era of presidential administration,” which Kagan 
believes has made the regulatory activity of executive agencies “more and more 
 
132.  See id.; Kagan, supra note 4. In addition, three other works that discuss the general subject 
of politics in agency decisionmaking are well worth mentioning. The first is a recent piece 
that makes the argument that “swerves” or “changes” in agency policies due to changes in 
administration are not necessarily arbitrary or capricious within the meaning of the APA. See 
Joshua McKarcher, Restoring Reason: Reformulating the Swerve Doctrine of Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers v. State Farm, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1342 (2008). The second is a book 
published in 1988 by Professor Martin Shapiro, which criticizes courts for treating 
rulemaking agencies like courts rather than like “subordinate legislatures” and for effectively 
driving “the very prudential decisions that ought to be out front and subject to public and 
judicial scrutiny under a technological smoke screen.” SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 156, 171. 
The third is a forthcoming article by Professor Nina Mendelson. See Mendelson, supra note 
123. Professor Mendelson’s work presents detailed evidence of agency silence regarding 
presidential influence on agency rulemaking and argues for greater disclosure by agencies of 
such presidential influence. Id. Its primary focus is on the need for agency disclosure of 
political influences rather than on judicial review or the arbitrary and capricious doctrine 
more specifically. In particular, Professor Mendelson argues that instead of focusing 
primarily on judicial review (as this Article does), we should call for a more transparent role 
for political influences by imposing procedural requirements on agencies that require them 
to disclose executive supervision. See id. at 3, 39-42. 
133.  EDLEY, supra note 4, at 190. 
134.  Id. at 192. 
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an extension of the President’s own policy and political agenda.”135 At the end 
of her lengthy article, Kagan considers in a short section what the arrival of 
presidential administration might mean for various judicial review doctrines, 
including hard look review. In that Section, she suggests that the rise in the 
presidential control model of agency decisionmaking should lead courts to alter 
hard look review so that courts look not only for technical, expert-driven 
explanations but also for publicly disclosed political factors that demonstrate 
presidential leadership and accountability.136 
Both Edley’s and Kagan’s works provide some much-needed attention to 
the virtues of political judgment in regulatory decisionmaking. However, 
neither is sufficient. Kagan’s work speaks only very briefly about how agencies 
and courts might alter their thinking to enable arbitrary and capricious review 
to embrace political influences, and Edley’s book, which was published in 
1990, was unable to fully capitalize on more recent developments in 
administrative law, such as the Chevron deference doctrine,137 that point away 
from an expertise-based notion of agency decisionmaking and toward a 
political accountability model. 
Thus, in the end, we are left with the following picture: courts have read 
arbitrary and capricious review in a way that enables them to search 
rulemaking records for expert-based decisionmaking. Agencies—likely 
following courts’ cues—justify their rulemaking decisions in technocratic 
terms, failing to disclose or affirmatively hiding political influences. And 
scholars generally have uncritically accepted the current system’s focus on 
technocratic decisionmaking. 
i i .  the benefits of giving politics a place 
Despite how well entrenched the expertise-based view of hard look review 
has become in judicial doctrine, agency practice, and academic scholarship, 
there are real reasons to change this picture. Specifically, this Article proposes 
that arbitrary and capricious review be modified so that certain political 
influences would be viewed as an appropriate factor in rulemaking. Altering 
hard look review in this way—so that it openly embraces a transparent role for 
politics in agency decisionmaking—could yield four major benefits. First, 
 
135.  Kagan, supra note 4, at 2246, 2248. 
136.  Id. at 2380-83. 
137.  The “Chevron” deference doctrine is named after Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), in which the Court set up its now famous two-
step doctrine governing deference to reasonable agency constructions of ambiguous 
statutory provisions. 
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allowing agencies to unapologetically disclose political influences and enabling 
courts to credit openly political judgments would help to bring hard look 
review, which currently hinges on an outmoded model of “expert” 
decisionmaking, into harmony with other major administrative law doctrines 
that embrace the more current “political control” model. Second, giving 
politics its own sphere could help to take some of the political pressure off of 
science. Third, facilitating a role for politics would give courts yet another 
reason to defer to agencies, thereby offering a means of softening the 
“ossification” charge frequently leveled against arbitrary and capricious review. 
Fourth, encouraging agencies to disclose political factors—rather than hiding 
behind technocratic façades—would enable political influences to come out 
into the open, thereby enabling greater political accountability, monitoring, 
and transparency. This Part will discuss in turn each of these reasons for 
altering current conceptions of hard look review. 
A.  Bringing Greater Coherence to Administrative Law’s Vacillation Between 
Expertise and Politics 
One major reason why hard look review should be rethought is that it 
currently embraces aspects of an outmoded model of agency decisionmaking: 
the “expertise model.” During the Progressive Era through the New Deal 
period, agencies derived their legitimacy from the notion that they were made 
up of professional and capable government “experts” pursuing the “public 
interest.”138 Joseph Eastman, who served as a member of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, summed up this view of agencies as apolitical experts 
in 1928 when he wrote that independent regulatory commissions are “clearly 
nonpartisan in their makeup, and party policies do not enter into their 
activities except to the extent that such policies may be definitely registered in 
the statutes which they are sworn to enforce.”139 Similarly, James M. Landis, a 
 
138.  See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.7, at 25 (4th ed. 2002) (“The 
explosive growth of administrative agencies during the New Deal took place in an 
environment of reverence for technocratic solutions and judicial distrust of political 
institutions.”); see also SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 60-62 (“The Progressive creed was experts 
in the service of the public and government as essentially a set of technical services provided 
to the citizenry.”); Paul R. Verkuil, Understanding the “Public Interest” Justification for 
Government Actions, 39 ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 141, 141 (1998) (“The words ‘public 
interest’ are probably invoked more than any other to explain and justify government action, 
whether in delegations of legislative authority to agencies or in explanations by agency 
officials to the public.”). 
139.  Joseph B. Eastman, The Place of the Independent Commission, 12 CONST. REV. 95, 101 (1928). 
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major champion of the modern administrative state,140 articulated a similar 
view in 1938 when he wrote that administrators are bureaucratic “men of 
professional attainment” and “men bred to the facts” who “envisage 
governance as a career.”141 
By the time hard look review emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, this 
“expertise-based” model of agency decisionmaking had fallen out of favor.142 In 
place of the expertise-based model had come a new theory of agency 
behavior—the “capture” theory—which saw agencies not as apolitical experts 
but rather as entities that were susceptible to “capture” by the regulated 
industry.143 Yet even as the capture theory took hold, certain underpinnings of 
the expertise model—specifically, the notion that agencies had a duty to 
deliberate to “choose the good”—continued to persist in judges’ minds.144 
Courts, accordingly, sought to shape administrative law doctrine in a way that 
would enable them to smoke out agency capture and to force agencies to 
engage in technocratic decisionmaking open to participation by varying 
interest groups such that the public interest (rather than special interests) 
would be served.145 Hard look review was one of the main tools that the courts 
developed to ensure that agencies were looking at the statute and the evidence 
and were choosing answers that served the public good. In this sense, hard 
look review actually embraced certain aspects of the original expertise-based 
 
140.  In the 1930s, James Landis served as a member of the FTC, a member of the SEC, and chair 
of the SEC. See Carl McFarland, Landis’ Report: The Voice of One Crying in the Wilderness, 47 
VA. L. REV. 373, 374 n.2 (1961). 
141.  JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 154-55 (1938). 
142.  See SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 62-63 (describing how the “New Deal ideal of government by 
experts that flourished in the 1930s and 1940s began to tarnish badly in the fifties”); see also 
Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 
1761 (2007) (noting that by the 1970s, “[e]xperience had bred a certain amount of 
skepticism about the expertise model”). 
143.  See SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 62-66 (noting that the capture theory described the 
phenomenon of how agencies that regulate particular industries over time “tend . . . to see 
the world more and more the way the industry sees it” and begin “to regulate in the interest 
of the regulated”); see also supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the capture 
theory). 
144.  See SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 75 (noting that judges insisted that “agencies make right 
decisions clearly and consciously directed by properly articulated public values and resting 
on correct technical analysis”). 
145.  See id. (noting that courts viewed it as their duty to make sure that agencies “deliberated 
rightly,” which meant that the agency had deliberated “in the way a moral philosopher 
armed with technical as well as moral knowledge would deliberate” to “choose the good”); 
Bressman, supra note 142, at 1761 (noting that hard look’s reasoned decisionmaking 
requirement reflected an interest group representation model, which sought to promote 
participation in the decisionmaking process by all affected interests). 
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model of agency decisionmaking—specifically, those aspects that viewed 
agency decisionmaking as involving pursuit of the public good through a 
technocratic process. 
By the 1980s, administrative law took yet another turn by moving to 
embrace a new model of agency decisionmaking: the “political control” 
model.146 This model, which has since gained widespread acceptance,147 
acknowledges that many policymaking decisions made by agencies cannot be 
resolved through a myopic technocratic lens but rather are highly political 
decisions that should be made by politically accountable institutions.148 The 
political control model of agency decisionmaking, accordingly, legitimizes 
agency decisionmaking by stressing that agencies are subject to political 
control. 
Most scholars see political control of the administrative state as resting with 
the President due to the unique role he plays in overseeing agency action.149 
The President, for example, can steer administrative agencies through his 
 
146.  See Bressman, supra note 142, at 1763 (“By the 1980s, administrative law theory and doctrine 
had transitioned to presidential control of agency decisionmaking as a principal mechanism 
for legitimating such decisionmaking.”); David Zaring & Elena Baylis, Sending the 
Bureaucracy to War, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1359, 1370-77 (2007) (noting the shift from expertise 
toward a political model of agency decisionmaking); see also 1 PIERCE, supra note 138, § 1.7, 
at 25-26 (describing increased focus on presidential control over the administrative state); 
Kagan, supra note 4 (describing the rise in the presidential control model of agency 
decisionmaking). 
147.  See James F. Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President: An Overview 
and Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DUKE L.J. 851, 851-53 (2001) (describing the 
widespread belief in presidential regulatory review); Bressman, supra note 142, at 1764 
(noting that the presidential control model enjoys “bipartisan political appeal” and “broad 
scholarly appeal” and that it “has enjoyed widespread support”); cf. Matthew C. 
Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53, 59 (2008) 
(noting that “[s]cholars with diverse ideological and methodological commitments have 
asserted that . . . bureaucratic policy should track majoritarian values and that this goal is 
best advanced by giving decision-making authority to the most politically accountable 
officials,” which implies “the need for presidential control over bureaucratic policymaking, 
because the president is the institutional actor most responsive to the preferences of a 
national majority”). 
148.  See generally 1 PIERCE, supra note 138, § 1.7, at 25-26 (discussing the recognition that 
policymaking is political). 
149.  See, e.g., Blumstein, supra note 147, at 855 (“[C]entralized presidential review of agency 
regulatory activity is an understandable and salutary development.”); Philip J. Harter, 
Executive Oversight of Rulemaking: The President Is No Stranger, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 557, 568 
(1987) (“We vote for presidents, not secretaries or administrators. . . . White House 
oversight places accountability precisely where it should be, namely, where the electorate 
can do something about it.”); Kagan, supra note 4, at 2384 (“Presidential administration . . . 
advances political accountability by subjecting the bureaucracy to the control mechanism 
most open to public examination and most responsive to public opinion.”). 
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power to appoint and to remove executive officials.150 In addition, presidents 
increasingly have put specific mechanisms into place to achieve greater 
regulatory control, including various executive orders issued by recent 
presidents that seek to control agencies and to subject them to oversight by the 
OMB.151 
Other scholars who subscribe to the political control model, however, focus 
on Congress rather than the President.152 Among these scholars are positive 
political theorists.153 These scholars emphasize how Congress can use a number 
of formal and informal tools to exert oversight and influence over agency 
policymaking, including Congress’s ability to hold oversight hearings 
(sometimes called “police patrols”) and its ability to respond to alarms sounded 
 
150.  The President’s appointment powers are spelled out in the Constitution in the 
“Appointments Clause.” See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Although there is no equivalent 
“Removal Clause,” the Supreme Court has held that Congress cannot constrain the 
President’s removal power over executive officials in a way that would unduly interfere with 
the President’s constitutionally appointed duty under Article II to faithfully execute the 
laws. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). The Supreme Court is poised to speak to 
the issue of removal again this Term in a pending case involving the constitutionality of the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. See Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. 
Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2378 (U.S. 
May 18, 2009) (No. 08-861). 
151.  See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993); Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 
C.F.R. 323 (1986); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982); see also Nicholas Bagley & 
Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 
1261 (2006) (describing how Reagan “tapped the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
to review agency rulemaking and help streamline the administrative state”); Blumstein, 
supra note 147, at 863-70 (describing the Reagan and Clinton Administration’s embrace of 
executive orders to structure regulatory review). 
152.  See generally Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 64-65 
(2006) (observing that presidential control over administration has received significant legal 
attention but that Congress’s role in administration has been “insufficiently noted”); Zaring 
& Baylis, supra note 146, at 1371 (contrasting how some theorists “have focused their 
attention on congressional control of agencies and have addressed the competence of 
agencies to act by considering how Congress would oversee their actions” whereas 
“Presidentialists, on the other hand, have cited the political choices that agencies make with 
the president and have characterized agency action as subject to strong presidential 
control”). 
153.  See, e.g., Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, 
Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. 
REV. 431 (1989); Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight 
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984). See generally 
David B. Spence, Administrative Law and Agency Policy-Making: Rethinking the Positive Theory 
of Political Control, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 407, 414-15 (1997) (describing positive political 
theorists’ focus on Congress’s control over agencies). 
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by constituents (often called “fire-alarm” oversight).154 Congress also, of 
course, possesses the power of the purse and thus can exercise oversight over 
agencies by controlling their financial resources.155 In addition, Congress (or 
committees or small groups of Congressmen) can informally supervise 
agencies through a “variety of forms, including cajoling, adverse publicity, 
audits, investigations, committee hearings, factfinding missions, informal 
contacts with agency members and staff, and pressure on the President to 
appoint persons chosen by members of Congress to agency positions.”156 
Whether defined in terms of attention on the President or on Congress, the 
general scholarly embrace of the “political control” model began to gain 
traction in the courts in the 1980s. Most prominently, in 1984, the Supreme 
Court handed down Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.,157 its now famous decision establishing the Chevron “two-step.”158 In the 
course of explaining why courts should defer to agencies’ reasonable 
constructions of statutory ambiguities, Justice John Paul Stevens’s opinion 
stated: 
[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking 
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely 
upon the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its 
judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, 
the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political 
branch of the Government to make such policy choices . . . .159 
As this passage suggests, the rule of deference set forth in Chevron 
ultimately has been read to rest on a presumption of Congress’s delegatory 
intent: courts must defer to agency interpretations where Congress intends the 
 
154.  See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 153, at 165-66. 
155.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”). See generally Beermann, supra note 152, 
at 84 (“The power of the purse is among Congress’s most potent weapons in its effort to 
control the execution of the laws.”). 
156.  Beermann, supra note 152, at 70. 
157.  467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
158.  For some examples of articles discussing the significance and implications of the Chevron 
doctrine, see, for example, Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 
GEO. L.J. 833 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the 
Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002); and Kathryn A. Watts, 
Adapting to Administrative Law’s Erie Doctrine, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 997 (2007). 
159.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. 
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agency rather than the courts to make an interpretive judgment.160 However, 
the Court’s decision also acknowledges openly that presidential influences can 
validly impact an agency’s interpretive decisions where Congress has chosen to 
delegate interpretive powers to executive agencies.161 Thus, unlike the Court’s 
1983 decision in State Farm, which was silent about the relevance of political 
factors, Chevron underscored the relevance of political influences (and political 
accountability) to agencies’ interpretive processes. For this reason, Chevron can 
be seen as having “anchor[ed] the presidential control model.”162 
Other cases also have helped to solidify a place for political control of the 
regulatory state. Sierra Club v. Costle, a significant decision handed down by 
the D.C. Circuit in 1981, is one such case.163 In Costle, the D.C. Circuit 
considered a challenge brought against a rule adopted by the EPA governing 
emissions from coal burning power plants. Among the many challenges raised 
was a claim that improper political arm-twisting had taken place during 
postcomment, undocketed communications between the EPA and political 
actors, including a U.S. Senator, the President of the United States, White 
House staff, and other executive branch members.164 In rejecting the argument 
that the alleged congressional pressure was improper, the court in an opinion 
by Judge Patricia Wald165 held that it was “entirely proper for Congressional 
representatives vigorously to represent the interests of their constituents before 
administrative agencies engaged in informal, general policy rulemaking, so 
long as individual Congressmen do not frustrate the intent of Congress as a 
whole as expressed in statute, nor undermine applicable rules of procedure.”166 
In terms of the intra-executive communications, the court held that these 
too were unproblematic, going to great lengths to describe the need for the 
executive branch to “monitor the consistency of executive agency regulations 
with Administration policy.”167 The court noted that the President and his 
advisers “surely must be briefed fully and frequently about rules in the making, 
 
160.  See generally Merrill & Watts, supra note 158, at 479 (describing how the Court has made 
clear that “Chevron deference is grounded in a congressional intent to delegate primary 
interpretive authority to the agency”). 
161.  See generally Bressman, supra note 142, at 1764 (noting that Chevron is the “[m]ost 
prominent example” of how administrative law now reflects the presidential control model). 
162.  Id. at 1765. 
163.  657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
164.  Id. at 386-91. 
165.  Judge Wald had served as a “subcabinet appointee in the Carter administration.” EDLEY, 
supra note 4, at 178. 
166.  Costle, 657 F.2d at 409. 
167.  Id. at 405. 
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and their contributions to policymaking considered,” and it explained that 
“[o]ur form of government simply could not function effectively or rationally if 
key executive policymakers were isolated from each other and from the Chief 
Executive.”168 The court acknowledged that allowing agencies to face 
undisclosed presidential prodding might mean that an agency reaches “an 
outcome that is factually based on the record, but different from the outcome 
that would have obtained in the absence of Presidential involvement.”169 
However, the court was unconcerned by this possibility, noting that it did “not 
believe that Congress intended that the courts convert informal rulemaking 
into a rarified technocratic process, unaffected by political considerations or the 
presence of Presidential power.”170 Costle, accordingly, quite clearly embraces 
the political control model by expressing the view that informal rulemaking is a 
politically influenced process, not a technocratic process that must mimic the 
sanitized process used in a courthouse. 
Even though the political control model has been accepted in a variety of 
administrative law doctrines ranging from ex parte communications in Costle to 
judicial review of agency legal interpretations under Chevron, hard look review 
continues to insist on technocratic rather than political decisionmaking when it 
comes to agencies’ reason-giving duties.171 This means that one major 
advantage of rethinking hard look review as this Article proposes is that hard 
look could be better harmonized with administrative law’s current embrace of 
political decisionmaking.172 This would bring greater coherence to 
administrative law doctrine and theory by helping to resolve some of the 
current vacillation between politics and expertise. 
 
168.  Id. at 405-06; see also id. at 400 n.502 (“Democratic ideology requires control of 
administrative action by elected representatives of the people.” (quoting Seymour Scher, 
Conditions for Legislative Control, 25 J. POL. 526, 526 (1963))). 
169.  Id. at 408. 
170.  Id. 
171.  See supra Part I. 
172.  One could argue that instead of altering hard look review’s expert-driven slant to bring it in 
line with the presidential control model, an alternative might be to alter other administrative 
law doctrines to bring them in line with hard look’s expert-driven model. This approach, 
however, would be undesirable for several reasons. Most prominently, moving away from 
administrative law’s current political control model would reduce the opportunity for 
political accountability and monitoring of agencies. Cf. infra Section II.D. (discussing 
accountability benefits). 
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B. Creating Better Separation Between Science and Politics 
Second, encouraging agencies to disclose political factors could help to take 
some of the political pressure off of science, creating a more effective separation 
between science and politics.173 Under the current technocratic model’s focus 
on facts and evidence, agencies have an incentive to dress up their decisions in 
technocratic terms and to hide political influences. Agencies, accordingly, may 
well be tempted to align facts and science with political choices rather than 
giving science its own rightful place that is separate from political or value-
laden considerations.174 
Concerns along these lines surfaced regularly during the Bush 
Administration. For example, in the global warming context, the Bush White 
House was accused of attempting to rewrite an EPA report in order to 
downplay the risks of global warming,175 and in 2005, a NASA official accused 
the Administration of trying to keep him from discussing the effects of global 
warming.176 Even more recently, allegations surfaced in 2008 that Vice 
President Dick Cheney’s office “remov[ed] statements on health risks posed by 
global warming from a draft of a health official’s Senate testimony [in 
2007].”177 
Outside of the global warming context, similar charges were raised against 
the Bush Administration. In 2004, for example, more than sixty leading 
scientists, including twenty Nobel laureates, issued a statement accusing the 
 
173.  For an interesting book on the general ways in which politics may intrude on science, see 
RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC 
RESEARCH (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds., 2006). See also Wendy E. Wagner, The 
Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1617 (1995) (arguing that 
“agencies exaggerate the contributions made by science in setting toxic standards in order to 
avoid accountability for the underlying policy decisions”). 
174.  President Obama has taken steps to ensure that agencies do not distort science to serve 
political goals—most recently issuing a directive that seeks to guarantee scientific integrity. 
See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Puts His Own Spin on the Mix of Science with Politics, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2009, at A18 (discussing Obama’s directive to “guarantee scientific 
integrity, in federal policy making”). Obama’s directive has been read to seek to separate 
scientific judgments from policy judgments so that scientists are not making policy but 
rather are merely providing the best available scientific information to policymakers, who 
then may take both science and politics into account in setting policy. Cf. id. (noting that the 
directive “will not divorce science from politics, or strip ideology from presidential 
decisions”). 
175.  See Jeremy Symons, How Bush and Co. Obscure the Science, WASH. POST, July 13, 2003, at B4. 
176.  Juliet Eilperin, Putting Some Heat on Bush: Scientist Inspires Anger, Awe for Challenges on 
Global Warming, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2005, at A17. 
177.  Andrew C. Revkin, Cheney’s Office Said To Edit Draft Testimony on Warming, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 9, 2008, at A12. 
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Bush Administration of distorting scientific evidence in order to serve political 
goals.178 In addition, in 2007, former Surgeon General Richard H. Carmona 
accused the Bush Administration of muzzling him and preventing him from 
speaking on politically sensitive topics like stem cell research and the 
emergency contraceptive Plan B.179 
Regardless of whether or not these sorts of allegations are true (a question 
that this Article does not purport to resolve), the mere existence and frequency 
of such allegations suggests that the current demand for technical, scientific, 
expert-driven explanations from agencies may have elevated the stakes of 
science. Giving politics its own discrete, transparent, judicially-accepted role in 
agency rulemaking processes likely would help to take some of the pressure off 
of science. Politics and science, in other words, could each operate more 
appropriately if given their own respective spheres. 
C. Softening the “Ossification” Charge 
Third, embracing a role for politics would give agencies yet another way to 
justify their rulemaking decisions and thus courts would have yet another 
potential reason to defer to agencies’ decisions. This, in turn, could help to 
soften the “ossification” charge frequently leveled against arbitrary and 
capricious review.180 Essentially, those who assert that our current version of 
arbitrary and capricious review has “ossified” the rulemaking process note that 
hard look review has pushed agencies to draft lengthy statements of basis and 
purpose filled with lengthy explanations and data that courts ultimately “may, 
or may not, consider an adequate response to the 10,000-1,000,000 pages of 
comments” received by the agency.181 Some critics claim that this type of 
 
178.  See James Glanz, Scientists Say Administration Distorts Facts: Accusations Include Suppressing 
Reports and Stacking Committees, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2004, at A18; Guy Gugliotta & Rick 
Weiss, President’s Science Policy Questioned: Scientists Worry that Any Politics Will Compromise 
Their Credibility, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2004, at A2; Andrew C. Revkin, Bush vs. the 
Laureates: How Science Became a Partisan Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2004, at F1. 
179.  Christopher Lee, Ex-Surgeon General Says White House Hushed Him, WASH. POST, July 11, 
2007, at A1. 
180.  See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways To Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 
59, 93-95 (1995); Paul R. Verkuil, Comment, Rulemaking Ossification—A Modest Proposal, 47 
ADMIN. L. REV. 453, 457-58 (1995); see also supra note 124 and accompanying text (citing 
ossification literature). 
181.  Pierce, supra note 125, at 920; see also Jordan, supra note 124, at 395 (summarizing 
ossification arguments made by opponents of hard look review). 
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unpredictable judicial review has led certain agencies to stop using informal 
rulemaking and to turn to other modes of policymaking instead.182 
If agencies were allowed to justify their decisions in both technocratic and 
political terms, then these sorts of “ossification” charges likely would be 
softened because courts would have yet another reason to uphold agency 
decisions.183 In other words, if political influences could serve as yet another 
kind of reason justifying agency action, then agency decisions might be more 
likely to withstand judicial review and thus agencies might be more willing to 
engage in informal rulemaking. Although this alone might not be a sufficient 
reason for embracing political influences in the rulemaking realm, it 
nonetheless is a benefit that—when combined with even more compelling 
benefits, such as bringing greater coherence to administrative law and 
separating politics from science—suggests the value of giving politics a proper 
place. 
D. Enabling Greater Political Accountability 
Finally, a fourth significant reason (and perhaps the most important 
reason) for giving politics a place in agency rulemaking involves political 
accountability. Encouraging agencies to disclose political factors rather than 
hiding behind technocratic façades would enable more political influences to 
come out into the open, thereby enabling greater political accountability and 
monitoring.184 
As Professor Lisa Schultz Bressman has explained, hard look review’s 
reasoned decisionmaking requirement can be thought of as serving a 
significant “monitoring” purpose: by requiring agencies to explain their 
decisions in a transparent manner, political actors and their constituents gain 
access to information about agency action and can monitor agencies.185 The 
problem, of course, is that hard look review currently incentivizes agencies to 
 
182.  See Jordan, supra note 124, at 394. 
183.  Cf. Kagan, supra note 4, at 2382-83 (noting that enabling politics to play a role in hard look 
review would help to respond to the ossification charge often levied against hard look review 
because “courts would have an additional reason to defer to administrative decisions in 
which the President has played a role” and hence courts would reverse agency decisions less 
often). 
184.  See Mendelson, supra note 123, at 34 (arguing that the fact that presidential influences on 
agencies are currently not transparent “has significant adverse consequences, both for the 
appropriateness of presidential influence and for the legitimacy of agency decision 
making”); see also EDLEY, supra note 4, at 22 (noting that political accountability is one of the 
positive norms associated with decisions based on politics). 
185.  Bressman, supra note 142, at 1780. 
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disclose only certain decisionmaking factors—scientific, technical, or statutory 
factors—that are likely to gain judicial approval. Thus, political factors 
influencing agency decisions are kept out of the public’s eye and are not subject 
to open public scrutiny. This creates a type of monitoring gap: an agency’s 
scientific and technocratic reasoning can be closely monitored, whereas 
political influences directed toward agencies by Congress or the President will 
not be publicly disclosed and thus will not be subject to the same type of 
monitoring and accountability.186 This monitoring gap would be reduced 
(although likely not completely eliminated) if courts applied arbitrary and 
capricious review in a way that gave political influences an accepted place in 
rulemaking decisions.187 
The accountability benefits that would flow from expanding arbitrary and 
capricious review should follow regardless of whether independent or executive 
agencies are involved. Independent agencies do enjoy some job protection in 
terms of being insulated from the President’s broad removal powers.188 
However, the fact that they are not subject to the President’s unfettered 
removal powers does not mean that the President lacks the ability to exert 
influence over independent agencies in other ways, such as informal 
contacts.189 In addition, independent agencies certainly are not independent of 
Congress, which can control agencies’ budgets, jurisdiction, and statutory 
 
186.  See Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. 
L. REV. 443, 457 (1987) (arguing that because agencies do not disclose ex parte influences 
from the President, “[t]he public cannot judge the President’s reasons or motivations in 
deciding how to vote in the next election because the public is never even aware of the 
intervention, much less of its content”). 
187.  The monitoring gap would not be completely eliminated, even if politics were given an 
accepted place, if agencies were allowed to choose to disclose only some political influences 
and not others. See generally infra Section IV.B. (discussing whether disclosure of political 
influences should be mandated). 
188.  See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (upholding limits on the 
President’s ability to remove a member of the FTC, an independent regulatory 
commission). 
189.  See 1 PIERCE, supra note 138, § 7.9, at 500-01 (noting that the President can exert control over 
policymaking by independent agencies through informal means, such as by simply calling or 
having a subordinate call “the critical decisionmakers at the agency to express the 
President’s views”); Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party 
Polarization and the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 498 (2008) 
(concluding that institutional designs to insulate independent agencies do not mean that 
Presidents lack control over agencies and noting that “there is good reason to think that 
independent agencies will adhere to presidential preferences once a majority of 
commissioners are from the President’s party”). 
WATTS_119_2.DOC  
the yale law journal 119:2   2009  
44 
 
commands.190 As Justice Scalia recently put it, “independent agencies are 
sheltered not from politics but from the President, and it has often been observed 
that their freedom from presidential oversight (and protection) has simply 
been replaced by increased subservience to congressional direction.”191 
One key to achieving monitoring and accountability benefits must be 
stressed: courts would have to be clear that political influences can help to 
justify agency decisions only when agencies openly and transparently disclose 
such influences in their rulemaking records.192 This means that the agency 
would need to expressly reference the political influences in its public 
rulemaking documents, such as a notice of proposed rulemaking, a statement 
of basis and purpose accompanying a final rule, or a statement explaining the 
denial of a rulemaking petition pursuant to section 555(e) of the APA. If a court 
could discern by, for example, combing public press accounts, that presidential 
policy likely influenced an agency’s rulemaking proceeding but the agency 
failed to disclose the political influence in its rulemaking record, then the court 
could not credit the presidential policy as a factor supporting the rulemaking. 
Rather, in order to permit the reasoned decisionmaking requirement to serve 
its monitoring purpose, courts would need to enforce the well-established rule 
that “an administrative order must be judged” solely “upon [those grounds] 
which the record discloses that [the] action was based.”193 Courts, in other 
words, would need to refuse to “‘rummag[e]’ through the record to elicit” a 
rationale not clearly relied upon by the agency.194 Agencies themselves would 
face the burden of sufficiently indicating the reasons for their actions in 
regulatory documents. This rule, which flows from the famous Chenery 
decisions decided by the Supreme Court in 1943 and 1947, serves to ensure that 
agencies disclose all of the evidence and reasoning on which they wish to rely 
 
190.  See generally Beermann, supra note 152, at 109 (noting that independent agencies “are 
supposed to be insulated from politics, but the truth is that while the independent agencies 
may be insulated from the President, they are often much more responsive to direct (albeit 
informal) congressional supervision than agencies within the executive branch”). 
191.  FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1815 (2009) (emphasis added). 
192.  Edley previously reached a similar conclusion about the importance of bringing political 
influences out into the open. See EDLEY, supra note 4, at 190-91 (“The disclosure of the 
subjective, ideological, and electoral factors that influence the agency’s decision is a crucial 
step toward disciplining them. The failure of courts to demand disclosure encourages secret 
politics, pretermitting the process of continuing, between-elections political 
accountability.”). 
193.  SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943). 
194.  Conn. Light & Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 535 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
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in defending their decisions.195 If certain political influences factoring into an 
agency’s rulemaking decision were not set forth by the agency in its rulemaking 
record with “such clarity as to be understandable,”196 then the monitoring 
function would not be fulfilled. 
i i i .  the mechanics of giving politics a place 
It is fairly easy to articulate the reasons why arbitrary and capricious review 
should be altered to embrace a role for political influences. It is more difficult 
to articulate precisely when political influences should be accepted in 
rulemaking decisions and when they should not be since the inquiry is likely to 
depend on the facts of each particular case. Despite the challenges of 
articulating generally applicable principles, this Part attempts to sketch out the 
mechanics of how political influences could be embraced by arbitrary and 
capricious review by addressing four specific questions. First, when should 
statutes be read as signaling Congress’s intent to allow or disallow any agency 
reliance upon political influences? Second, assuming that Congress has not 
prohibited an agency from relying upon political factors in a particular 
statutory scheme, what types of political influences should count as legitimate 
factors (rather than corrupting factors) when openly and transparently 
disclosed by the agency? Third, who stands as a potential source of legitimate 
political influence? Finally, fourth, what specific types of rulemaking decisions 
might most appropriately be influenced by political factors? 
A. Determining Congress’s Intent Regarding Political Factors 
It is a well-accepted rule of administrative law that federal administrative 
agencies, which act pursuant to congressional delegations of power, must act 
consistent with congressional intent and must consider only factors that 
Congress intended the agency to consider.197 This means that if a statute 
 
195.  See Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 94; see also SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 196 
(1947) (reiterating the rule that “a reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or 
judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the 
propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency”). 
196.  Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196. 
197.  See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) 
(“Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on 
factors which Congress has not intended it to consider . . . .”); JERRY L. MASHAW, RICHARD 
A. MERRILL & PETER M. SHANE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 
294 (5th ed. 2003) (“[A]gencies empowered by Congress to regulate may do so only if 
consistent with their underlying statutory mandates.”). 
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expressly indicates Congress’s decision to foreclose a certain factor, such as 
economic or political factors, from an agency’s decisionmaking calculus, then 
the agency plainly should not be allowed to rely upon that factor in justifying 
its decision.198 The key, accordingly, is to determine Congress’s intent. 
Occasionally, Congress will make its intent known by explicitly or 
implicitly prohibiting agencies from considering certain decisional factors that 
might otherwise logically be relevant to the agency’s decisionmaking 
process.199 One prominent example of this can be found in the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA) enacted by Congress in 1973.200 Under the ESA, the 
Secretary of the Interior must determine by regulation whether or not a species 
qualifies as endangered or threatened because of any of five specified factors.201 
In making an assessment based on the five factors, the ESA directs that the 
Secretary must make a determination “solely on the basis of the best scientific and 
commercial data available . . . after conducting a review of the status of the 
species and after taking into account those efforts, if any, being made by any 
State or foreign nation, or any political subdivision of a State or foreign nation, 
to protect such species.”202 Thus, because the statute itself requires the agency 
to rely solely on the “best science” available when making listing decisions, the 
Secretary is foreclosed from considering other factors, such as economic and 
political considerations.203 This has led one former Secretary of the Interior, 
 
198.  Cf. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that an administrative 
rulemaking may be overturned on the grounds of political pressure if the “content of the 
pressure . . . is designed to force [the agency] to decide upon factors not made relevant by 
Congress in the applicable statute” and if the agency’s determination was actually affected by 
the “extraneous considerations”) (emphasis added). 
199.  See generally Richard J. Pierce, What Factors Can an Agency Consider in Making a Decision?, 
2009 MICH. ST. L. REV (forthcoming) (manuscript at 4, on file with The Yale Law Journal), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1157497 (“Congress rarely 
explicitly forbids an agency from considering a decisional factor that is logically relevant to a 
decision or class of decisions. It sometimes chooses decisional standards that implicitly 
preclude consideration of a logically relevant decisional factor, however.”). 
200.  Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006). 
201.  Id. § 1533(a)(1). 
202.  Id. § 1533(b)(1)(A). 
203.  But see Holly Doremus, Using Science in a Political World: The Importance of Transparency in 
Natural Resource Regulation, in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE 
DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 143, 164 (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds., 2006) 
(noting that “[n]atural resource management decisions [such as those made under the 
ESA], although they appear superficially to be dictated by scientific information, in fact can 
hide numerous judgments,” such as policy-driven and politically-driven judgments). See 
generally Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (holding in the famous “snail darter” 
case that the ESA placed an “incalculable” value on endangered species and thus did not 
empower the courts to weigh the economic cost of halting completion of a dam against the 
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Dirk Kempthorne, to call the ESA “perhaps the least flexible law Congress has 
ever enacted.”204 
As Secretary Kempthorne’s comment suggests, most statutes delegating 
rulemaking powers to agencies are not as rigid as the ESA. In fact, for most 
statutory schemes, no clear line separates those “permissible” factors that may 
be taken into account from those that are “impermissible.” In particular, 
statutes delegating rulemaking powers to agencies generally have little, if 
anything, to say about Congress’s views on the propriety of agency 
consideration of political influences, such as presidential consultation or 
congressional pressure.205 This congressional silence could plausibly be read in 
one of two ways: congressional silence about the propriety of consideration of 
political factors forecloses agencies from considering such factors,206 or 
alternatively Congress’s silence leaves agencies free to consider political factors 
and influences.207 If congressional silence were read to mean the former, then 
the proposal set forth in this Article advocating for a place for politics in agency 
rulemaking would quite plainly flout congressional design. 
A line of D.C. Circuit cases suggests an answer, supporting the view that 
when Congress is silent (i.e., when it is silent with respect to whether a 
logically relevant factor may be considered), Congress’s silence should be read 
to leave room for the agency to consider the factor in its decisionmaking 
process.208 For example, in a D.C. Circuit case decided in 1998 involving 
whether the EPA had improperly considered international law and 
international trade in crafting a new rule involving gasoline, the D.C. Circuit 
 
benefit of saving the snail darter species); W. Watersheds Project v. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 
535 F. Supp. 2d 1173 (D. Idaho 2007) (finding that the Fish and Wildlife Service acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously when determining whether to list the greater sage-grouse under 
the ESA by failing to use “best science” and by allowing extensive political interference by a 
deputy assistant secretary in the Interior Department). 
204.  See The Threatened Polar Bear; It Gets Federal Protection, but Nothing To Save Its Habitat, 
WASH. POST, May 15, 2008, at A14 (reporting on Kempthorne’s statement). 
205.  MASHAW ET AL., supra note 197, at 292 (“Virtually all statutes conveying rulemaking power 
to executive (as well as ‘independent’) agencies are silent on such questions as whether the 
agency head may consult with the President or his agents and, if so, on what basis.”). 
206.  One reason to read Congress’s silence this way might be that Congress could have legislated 
against the backdrop of the current understanding of arbitrary and capricious review. In 
other words, Congress might have remained silent in most statutes about what factors can 
and cannot be considered by agencies because Congress assumed that the judicial pattern 
favoring technocratic decisionmaking would prevail. 
207.  See 1 PIERCE, supra note 138, § 7.4, at 453. 
208.  See Warren v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Grand Canyon Air Tour Coal. v. FAA, 
154 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also 1 PIERCE, supra note 138, § 7.4, at 453-55 (discussing the 
D.C. Circuit’s cases on the issue). 
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explained that it is generally reluctant “to infer from congressional silence an 
intention to preclude the agency from considering factors other than those 
listed in a statute.”209 This general rule about congressional silence rests on the 
notion that “Congress always wants an agency to attempt to further a list of 
societal goals that is far too long to incorporate in any statute.”210 
A contrary rule—which would read congressional silence to mean the 
exclusion of certain decisional factors, such as presidential communications—
would significantly undermine the currently accepted notion that 
administrative agencies’ legitimacy hinges on politically accountable actors.211 
As the D.C. Circuit has explained, “Americans rightly expect their elected 
representatives to voice their grievances and preferences concerning the 
administration of our laws.”212 Thus, if Congress’s silence in statutory schemes 
about the relevance of presidential and congressional views were read to mean 
that such factors cannot be considered by agencies, then agencies would be 
deprived of “legitimate sources of information.”213 In addition, reading 
Congress’s silence in this way would effectively mean that Congress has 
stripped not just the President of his influence but also stripped its own 
members of the ability to influence agency decisions through informal 
congressional pressure, oversight hearings, or other congressional 
communications—all tools that Congress uses on a regular basis.214 
The text of the APA also lends support to the argument that Congress 
generally does not intend to prohibit agencies from considering political 
influences in the informal rulemaking context. The APA expressly regulates ex 
parte contacts in the context of formal adjudications and formal rulemakings 
required to be conducted on the record but not in the context of informal 
notice-and-comment rulemakings.215 This suggests that Congress did not 
intend to prohibit or limit ex parte communications, including those coming 
from political actors, in informal rulemakings. 
 
209.  Warren, 159 F.3d at 624. 
210.  1 PIERCE, supra note 138, § 7.4, at 453 (citing MASHAW & HARFST, supra note 4, at 202-23 
(1990)). 
211.  See supra Section I.A. 
212.  Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 409 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
213.  Id. at 410. 
214.  Another reason to assume that Congress intended to allow politics to play a role in agency 
decisions can be found—at least as to executive agencies—in Congress’s choices regarding 
agency structure. By creating executive agencies whose heads are removable at will by the 
President, Congress seems to have quite clearly accepted the notion that the President would 
be allowed to influence agency decisions. 
215.  See Dist. No. 1, Pac. Coast Dist. v. Mar. Admin., 215 F.3d 37, 42-43 (2000) (citing 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 553(c), 554(a), 557(d) (2000)).  
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Despite the various reasons why the D.C. Circuit’s rule allowing 
extrastatutory decisional factors makes sense, the Supreme Court recently 
muddied the waters a bit. Most notably, in Massachusetts v. EPA,216 the 
majority acknowledged that the EPA had given a “laundry list” of reasons not 
to regulate, such as a desire to avoid inefficient, piecemeal regulation and a 
desire to avoid interfering with the President’s own foreign policy initiatives.217 
The Court, however, ultimately dismissed all of these policy-driven 
considerations, declaring that they were “divorced from the statutory text.”218 
The statute provided that the Administrator of the EPA “shall by regulation 
prescribe . . . standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any 
class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in 
his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”219 According to the Court, 
the EPA was required to “ground its reasons for action or inaction in the 
statute.”220 
The Court’s conclusion—that the EPA’s justifications for declining to defer 
were divorced from the statutory text—is somewhat confusing because, as 
Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissenting opinion, the statutory text “says 
nothing at all about the reasons for which the Administrator may defer making a 
judgment.”221 Instead, the statutory text expressly dictates only that when the 
Administrator actually “makes a judgment [about] whether to regulate 
greenhouse gases, that judgment must relate to whether they are air pollutants 
that ‘cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated 
to endanger public health or welfare.’”222 Massachusetts, accordingly, could very 
easily be read as a rejection of the D.C. Circuit’s rule that congressional silence 
leaves agencies with ample room to consider extrastatutory decisional 
factors.223 Although at least one commentator has read Massachusetts this 
 
216.  549 U.S. 497 (2007). Another case recently decided by the Supreme Court, National Ass’n of 
Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007), also arguably confuses matters 
a bit. For a detailed discussion of the significance of National Ass’n of Home Builders, see 
Pierce, supra note 199, at 14-18. 
217.  Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533. 
218.  Id. at 532 (emphasis added). 
219.  42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000). 
220.  Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535 (emphasis added). 
221.  Id. at 552 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
222.  Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2000)). 
223.  Cf. id. (noting that the statutory text is “silent, as texts are often silent about permissible 
reasons for the exercise of agency discretion”). See generally Pierce, supra note 199, at 14 (“I 
have no doubt that many petitioners will argue that Massachusetts . . . stand[s] for the 
proposition that congressional silence with respect to a decisional factor should be 
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way,224 there is reason to doubt that the Court would follow this reading of 
Massachusetts in future cases.225 
First, although the majority in Massachusetts chastised the EPA for basing 
its decision on factors divorced from the statutory text, the Court did not 
definitively say that the EPA’s decision about whether or not to regulate had to 
be based solely on factors that are embraced by the statutory text. Instead, the 
Court expressly noted at the end of its decision that it was not reaching the 
question of whether “policy concerns can inform EPA’s actions in the event 
that [the EPA] makes” an endangerment finding.226 In other words, the Court 
seems to have left the door open for the agency to decline to regulate for policy 
reasons not set forth in the statutory text after the EPA exercised its expertise to 
assess whether greenhouse gases endanger the public health and welfare.227 
Furthermore, in embracing a deferential standard of review for denials of 
rulemaking petitions, the Court at least implicitly recognized that policy-driven 
considerations might impact an agency’s decision about whether or not to 
regulate, noting that “an agency has broad discretion to choose how best to 
marshal its limited resources and personnel to carry out its delegated 
responsibilities.”228 
Second, Massachusetts was not a normal, run-of-the mill case: Massachusetts 
dealt with global warming, an issue that many consider the most important 
environmental issue of our time.229 The case resulted in a sharp 5-4 split among 
 
interpreted as congressional rejection of that factor and as a prohibition on agency 
consideration of that factor in making decisions . . . .”). 
224.  See Jack M. Beermann, The Turn Toward Congress in Administrative Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 727, 
740 (2009) (arguing that Massachusetts supports the general principle that “when an agency 
decides whether to take even preliminary steps in the regulatory process that might lead to 
rulemaking, it must consider Congress’s factors rather than the agency’s or the 
administration’s preferred factors”); cf. Pierce, supra note 199, at 12-13 (“I fear that the 
majority opinion in Massachusetts will be interpreted to reject the long line of D.C. Circuit 
opinions in which that court has interpreted congressional silence to permit an agency to 
consider a logically relevant decisional factor . . . .”). 
225.  Pierce, supra note 199, at 18 (“I doubt that any Justice actually wants lower courts to 
interpret Massachusetts . . . to stand for the broad proposition that congressional silence with 
respect to a factor that is logically relevant to an agency decision must be interpreted to 
prohibit the agency from considering the factor.”). 
226.  Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 534-35. 
227.  See Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 85, at 1043. 
228.  Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 527 (noting that the scope of review is narrow). 
229.  See Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 85, at 1043; see also Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535 
(noting that petitioners seeking certiorari called global warming “the most pressing 
environmental challenge of our time”); Examining the Case for the California Waiver: Before 
the S. Subcomm. on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety, 110th Cong. 27 (2007) (statement of 
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the justices down ideological lines. Thus, the majority’s willingness to stretch 
to read congressional silence in the statute in a way that seriously constrained 
the hands of the EPA might be limited to the specifics of the immensely 
important and highly political case.230 In future cases, the Court could simply 
choose to limit its reasoning in Massachusetts to the specific provisions of the 
Clean Air Act at issue in Massachusetts rather than to draw broader, more 
general principles from the case about the permissibility of basing agency 
decisions on nonstatutory factors.231 
Finally, just this past Term the Court issued a divided decision, Entergy 
Corp. v. Riverkeeper, in which a different majority of the Court embraced the 
notion that congressional silence “represents ambiguity and an invitation for 
the [relevant agency] to decide for itself which factors should govern its 
regulatory approach.”232 In Entergy, the Justices split over whether “cost” was 
an appropriate factor to be considered by the EPA in making decisions under a 
specific section of the Clean Water Act, which directs the EPA to require that 
certain water intake structures “reflect the best technology available for 
minimizing adverse environmental impact.”233 Justice Scalia writing for a 
majority of the Court read Congress’s silence about the propriety of 
considering “cost” to mean that the agency—relying upon Chevron deference—
could reasonably conclude that a cost-benefit analysis was an appropriate 
decisional factor. Specifically, Justice Scalia explained that he read Congress’s 
silence in the relevant statute “to convey nothing more than a refusal to tie the 
agency’s hands as to whether cost-benefit analysis should be used, and if so to 
 
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Att’y Gen. of California) (“Global warming is the most important 
environmental and public health issue we face today.”).  
230.  See Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 85, at 1043; cf. Pierce, supra note 199, at 18 (discussing 
how the justices’ conclusions in Massachusetts were driven more by politics than by legal 
doctrine). The notion that judges should play a special role in environmental law cases—
although never embraced openly by the Supreme Court—has been expressly articulated by 
some judges, including Judge Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def.  
Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 547 F.2d 633, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (“Decisions in 
areas touching the environment or medicine affect the lives and health of all. These 
interests, like the First Amendment, have ‘always had a special claim to judicial 
protection.’”); Envtl. Def. Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
231.  For example, Massachusetts could be viewed as resting on very particular aspects of the Clean 
Air Act, including the fact that the statute provided that the Administrator “shall by 
regulation prescribe . . . standards” rather than using the term “may.” 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) 
(2000) (emphasis added). See Pierce, supra note 199, at 15 (noting the potential relevance of 
the word “shall”). 
232.  129 S. Ct. 1498, 1518 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority’s 
approach). 
233.  See id. at 1516; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2000). 
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what degree.”234 In contrast, Justice Stevens writing for himself, then-Justice 
Souter and Justice Ginsburg in dissent determined that Congress had chosen 
not to authorize cost-benefit analysis and that “Congress intended to control, 
not delegate, when cost-benefit analysis should be used.”235 In this sense, 
Massachusetts and Entergy suggest diverging approaches to congressional 
silence about the propriety of decisional factors—leaving it far from clear that 
Massachusetts should be read to mark out a definitive path on the subject. 
For these and other reasons,236 Massachusetts should not be read to signal a 
new take on congressional silence—at least not until the Court has a chance to 
openly grapple with the issue. Rather, it makes sense to continue to follow the 
D.C. Circuit’s rule on congressional silence, giving agencies the freedom to 
consider any factors that are logically relevant to agency decisions so long as 
Congress has not prohibited the agency from considering the factor. For 
purposes of the proposal set forth in this Article, adherence to this rule would 
mean that unless a statute explicitly or implicitly forecloses political 
considerations from an agency’s calculus altogether (as the ESA’s “best science” 
standard appears to do with respect to the listing of endangered species), 
agencies remain free to take some kinds of political influences into 
consideration in their rulemaking proceedings. In other words, a presumption 
would exist that when Congress is silent on the matter, Congress intended 
agencies to be able to consider all factors that are rationally and logically 
relevant to the agency’s decision, including certain political influences.237 This, 
however, simply begs yet another question: where should the line be drawn 
between rational and logically relevant political influences that we can presume 
Congress intended the agency to be able to consider versus those sorts of 
corrupting political influences that Congress would not intend an agency to 
consider?238 
 
234.  129 S. Ct. at 1508. 
235.  Id. at 1518 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
236.  See generally Pierce, supra note 199, at 14-18 (detailing various additional reasons why 
Massachusetts should not be read to mean that congressional silence on a factor forecloses 
agency consideration of the factor). 
237.  Cf. Kagan, supra note 4, at 2326-31 (suggesting that congressional delegations to agencies to 
engage in rulemaking that are silent on the issue of presidential involvement should 
presumptively be read to permit presidential guidance). 
238.  If Congress cannot be presumed to have intended the agency to consider a certain factor, 
then the agency plainly should not be allowed to consider it. In other words, the President 
or other political actors should not be allowed to inject decisional factors that Congress 
cannot be presumed to have intended the agency to consider. If the rule were otherwise, 
then we would be acknowledging the lack of legal constraints governing the delegation of 
power to the executive branch. In light of Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), such a lack of legal constraints would in turn suggest 
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B. Types of Political Factors That Might Appropriately Be Relied Upon 
Clearly not all political influences should be viewed as legitimate but 
neither should all political influences be treated as illegitimate. In thinking 
about how judges might approach this problem of line drawing, it is helpful to 
look to work by Cass Sunstein and other proponents of “civic republicanism” 
who have detailed as a descriptive matter how judges seek to (and as a 
normative matter how they ought to seek to) ensure that challenged 
governmental decisions implicating constitutional and administrative law 
issues are supported by some kind of “public value” rather than by a mere 
“naked preference” for one group over another.239 In other words, civic 
republicans assert that judges generally seek to ensure that political actors 
reflect on the public good and make decisions designed to advance the public 
interest and public values rather than merely caving to interest group 
pressure.240 
Leaving aside the normative question of whether judges ought to be 
searching for public values to support governmental decisions, the descriptive 
thesis seems quite powerful and persuasive: judges routinely seek out public 
justifications to support challenged governmental action. Judges, for example, 
are quite comfortable concluding that a statute is constitutional because it 
furthers some kind of reasonable or legitimate governmental interest,241 but 
they would not be comfortable saying a statute is constitutional simply because 
it was approved by a majority of Congress and signed by the President. 
Assuming that this descriptive picture of courts is correct and that the 
judiciary does in fact seek to locate public values to support governmental 
action, then it seems inconceivable that the courts would suddenly become 
 
the unavailability of judicial review because the question would rest within the President’s 
discretion and thus would be political, not legal, in nature. 
239.  See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. 
L. REV. 1511 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. 
REV. 29 (1985) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interest Groups]; Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences 
and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689 (1984) [hereinafter Sunstein, Naked 
Preferences]. 
240.  See Sunstein, Interest Groups, supra note 239, at 63 (“Reviewing courts are attempting to 
ensure that the agency has not merely responded to political pressure but that it is instead 
deliberating in order to identify and implement the public values that should control the 
controversy.”). 
241.  Cf. Sunstein, Naked Preferences, supra note 239, at 1692 (“The ‘reasonableness’ constraint of 
the due process clause is perhaps the most obvious example. The minimum requirement 
that government decisions be something other than a raw exercise of political power has 
been embodied in constitutional doctrine under the due process clause before, during, and 
after the Lochner era.”). 
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willing to embrace raw politics, crass political horse trading, or pure 
partisanship as factors that could help to legitimize an agency’s decision. Nor 
does it seem as a normative matter that courts ought to accept reliance on raw 
politics or pure partisanship in the rulemaking realm given that Congress likely 
did not intend such influences to be logically relevant decisional factors in an 
agency’s rulemaking process.242 Put another way, courts should be weary of 
political influences resting on pure partisan politics because such influences are 
not tied to the public values or policies being implemented by the statutory 
scheme and hence Congress cannot be presumed to have authorized agency 
reliance on such factors.243 In contrast, it is much easier to presume that 
Congress would view political considerations tied to policy choices or public 
values falling within the general rubric of the statutory scheme as logically 
relevant considerations that the agency was authorized to take into account in 
implementing the statutory scheme. 
Take, for example, a recent decision issued by the Eastern District of New 
York, Tummino v. Torti.244 There, the district court reviewed the FDA’s 
decision involving the nonprescription availability of the emergency 
contraceptive Plan B. In asserting that the FDA’s action was not the product of 
reasoned decisionmaking, the plaintiffs alleged that the FDA’s decisions were 
improperly motivated by political considerations outside the scope of the 
FDA’s statutory authority because “the FDA bowed to political pressure from 
the White House and anti-abortion constituents despite the uniform 
recommendation of the FDA’s scientific review staff to approve over-the-
counter access to Plan B without limitation.”245 In agreeing with the plaintiffs 
that the FDA’s decision was not the result of reasoned decision making, the 
district court seemed unwilling to presume that Congress intended raw 
political calculations (e.g., the desire to see success achieved in confirmation 
hearings) as rationally or logically related to the agency’s statutory mandate.246 
To take another example, imagine that the FDA during the Obama 
Administration rescinded various preemption regulations promulgated during 
the Bush Administration, and the FDA justified its decision by boldly stating: 
“The President directed us to rescind the preemption regulations in order to 
reward the trial lawyers, who provided significant campaign support to the 
President.” Given that this explanation seeks to serve a private interest but not 
any broader conception of the public good, it is highly unlikely that any court 
 
242.  See supra notes 197-238 and accompanying text. 
243.  See id. 
244.  603 F. Supp. 2d 519 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
245.  Id. at 538. 
246.  See id. at 546. 
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today would view this as a legitimate factor supporting the FDA’s decision. 
Nor should courts be willing to presume that Congress intended such raw 
political calculations (i.e., the desire to feed an important campaign 
contributor) as rationally or logically related to the agency’s statutory mandate. 
Similarly, an agency’s assertion that it adopted a particular standard (such 
as a standard setting permissible emission levels at 0.5 parts per million) 
because “the President made us do it” should not fare any better.247 Allowing 
an agency to base a decision on such a bald presidential direction—unbounded 
by the relevant statutory scheme, facts, or evidence—would leave the President 
with unfettered discretion to direct the outcome of an agency’s decision in a 
way unconnected to any articulation of public values or the public interest. 
This would be problematic for at least three reasons. First, as Professor Peter 
Strauss has pointed out, accepting the notion that the President enjoys 
unfettered discretion to direct an agency’s decision would run smack up against 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison suggesting the 
unavailability of judicial review where a matter rests within the President’s 
discretion and is political in nature.248 Second, it is highly unlikely that courts 
would be willing to presume that Congress—having set up a statutory scheme 
designed to direct and cabin the relevant agency’s discretion—nonetheless 
intended for the President to enjoy unfettered discretion to direct the outcome 
of the agency’s decision-making process. Finally, as Professor Mendelson has 
concluded, allowing an agency to simply proclaim that the “President said so” 
seems arbitrary because it does not seem to supply any reason at all.249 
At the other end of the spectrum, when the EPA under the Obama 
Administration issued its proposed rule in 2009 finding that greenhouse gases 
do endanger the public health and welfare within the meaning of section 
202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act,250 imagine that it had explained its decision by 
 
247.  See Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 21 (2001) (arguing that an agency’s claim that 
“[t]he President made me do it” would delegitimize the agency action rather than count as a 
“good” reason); see also Mendelson, supra note 123, at 52 (arguing that “[s]aying ‘The 
President said so,’ seems arbitrary because it does not identify any more general principle 
that might explain the choice made either within the agency or within the executive review 
process”). 
248.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see also Peter L. Strauss, Legislation That Isn’t—Attending to 
Rulemaking’s “Democracy Deficit,” 97 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009-2010) (manuscript at 
11, on file with The Yale Law Journal) (arguing that if an agency based a decision on 
political factors not authorized by Congress, this would “take us straight into the quagmire 
suggested” by Marbury). 
249.  See Mendelson, supra note 123, at 52. 
250.  See Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under 
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886 (Apr. 24, 2009). 
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pointing to factual and scientific evidence to support its conclusion and also by 
stating: “Our conclusion that carbon dioxide emissions endanger the public 
health and welfare serves the President’s overarching policy goal of protecting 
the environment and is consistent with the President’s foreign policy 
initiatives, including his promises to foreign leaders that he will work to 
combat global warming to the extent possible.” This kind of political influence 
speaks not in raw political terms but rather speaks to broader policy concerns 
and public values that the Clean Air Act touches upon—namely, protecting the 
environment. It, accordingly, is the type of political influence that courts 
should feel much more comfortable allowing to help justify agency action. 
As this discussion should make clear, trying to define what sorts of political 
influences should be viewed as legitimate and which should be viewed as 
illegitimate is not an easy task that can be summed up with a precise test. 
However, it does seem clear that courts are unlikely to (and should be 
unwilling to) view political arguments as rational statutory considerations 
authorized by Congress when they are driven by pure partisanship or raw 
politics. Conversely, courts ought to be much more likely to accept political 
influences as congressionally authorized considerations where the political 
factors seek to implement policy considerations or value judgments tied in 
some sense to the statutory scheme being implemented.251 Thus, “legitimate” 
political influences from political actors should be defined in a way that 
includes policy considerations and political value judgments (e.g., “The 
President favors a reading of the Clean Air Act that excludes greenhouse gases 
from its coverage because the statute cannot work effectively or 
comprehensively to deal with global warming.”), but excludes raw political 
goals or pure partisan politics (e.g., “The President has directed us not to 
regulate greenhouse gases because his key campaign contributors do not want 
to incur regulatory costs associated with preventing global climate change.”). 
Of course, the inherent fuzziness of the line between impermissible and 
permissible political influences makes it possible that agencies could try to 
manipulate the line by spinning partisan or raw political decisions as somehow 
being driven by public values or policy choices. While this is certainly possible, 
the harm of this possibility is minimized by the fact that, even under such a 
“hide the ball” scenario, agencies at least will be acknowledging some kinds 
(even if not all kinds) of political influences and thus will be opening the door 
 
251.  Examples of legitimate policy considerations could include the allocation of agency 
workload, personnel, and budgets. These policy considerations clearly embody “political” 
choices. For example, when Congress allocates money to different agencies, it is engaging in 
a political decision (e.g., should it give more money to fund environmental efforts or 
financial sector regulation?). 
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for greater accountability and monitoring. Furthermore, courts might be able 
to decrease the likelihood that agencies will hide the ball by smoking out 
undisclosed, extra-record political influences,252 as well as by penalizing 
agencies for decisions that seem to be based upon undisclosed political 
influences.253 
C. Possible Sources of Political Influences 
Besides trying to define a line that can assist in separating legitimate 
political influences from illegitimate ones, it also is necessary to think about 
potential sources of political influence. This Section considers political 
influences coming from three possible sources: (1) direct presidential 
involvement through executive orders, presidential directives, or more 
informal presidential communications; (2) directives from other executive 
officials, such as the Vice President or the President’s Chief of Staff; and (3) 
congressional oversight and pressure from members of Congress. Ultimately, 
this Section concludes that—if fully disclosed in the rulemaking record—all of 
these sources of political influences serve as potentially valid sources. 
1.  Presidential Directives, Executive Orders and Other More Informal 
Communications 
Directions from the President expressed through Executive Orders, 
directives, more informal communications, and “jawboning”254 all represent 
prime sources of political pressure directed at agencies.255 Given the 
prominence of the presidential control model today256 and given that the 
 
252.  See Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 543-44 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that the court 
may consider extra-record materials where an agency decision was made in bad faith, such 
as where the decision was tainted by impermissible political and ideological considerations). 
253.  See infra note 329 and accompanying text (discussing how courts presently are willing to 
penalize agencies for basing decisions on undisclosed evidence or studies). 
254.  For an article on the role of jawboning in the administrative state and whether such ex parte 
contacts should be limited, see Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte 
Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943 (1980). 
255.  See generally 1 PIERCE, supra note 138, § 7.9, at 497-503 (describing executive control over 
agency rulemaking); Blumstein, supra note 147, at 863-70 (describing the history of 
centralized presidential regulatory review); Kagan, supra note 4, at 2281-99 (describing 
President Clinton’s exertion of control over administrative agencies through executive 
orders and presidential directives); Verkuil, supra note 254, at 944-47 (analyzing White 
House contacts with administrative agencies). 
256.  See supra notes 149-151 and accompanying text. 
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Constitution vests the executive power with the President and requires him to 
“take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,”257 these sorts of presidential 
directions aimed at executive policymakers could serve as a legitimate and 
rational influence on agency decisions so long as the President does not seek to 
prod the agency to act contrary to the relevant statute or contrary to existing 
evidence. This means that a prime example of where presidential prodding 
should be allowed to come into play is when agencies make value-based 
judgments in the face of scientific uncertainty.258 
For example, if the President communicated to an agency his desire to see 
certain issues appear on the agency’s rulemaking agenda or to see certain 
discretionary rulemaking proceedings treated with priority over other issues,259 
the relevant agency should be able to explain its discretionary decision to move 
forward with high-priority rulemakings and not to move forward with others 
by reference to the President’s clearly expressed executive priorities.260 
Similarly, if the President reached out to an agency and expressed his views 
about how that agency’s policies might best fit together uniformly with the 
policies set by other agencies, the agency should be able to explain its 
policymaking decisions to a court by referencing its attempts to adhere to the 
President’s desire for uniform, consistent regulatory policy.261 Both of these 
sorts of influences coming from the President speak to policy-driven 
judgments rather than raw partisan politics and thus can be understood as 
 
257.  U.S. CONST. art II, §§ 1, 3. 
258.  See Kagan, supra note 4, at 2356-57 (noting that agencies often must make value-laden rather 
than expert-driven judgments and that a strong presidential role accordingly should be 
appropriate where, for example, agencies “confront the question, which science alone cannot 
answer, of how to make determinate judgments regarding the protection of health and 
safety in the face of both scientific uncertainty and competing public interests”). 
259.  See, e.g., Statement on Federal Regulations on Privacy of Medical Records, 37 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 611, 612 (Apr. 12, 2001) (statement by President Bush directing Secretary 
Thompson to “recommend appropriate modifications” to a medical privacy rule to address 
concerns about the content of the rule). 
260.  Air Quality, Chemical Substances, and Respiratory Protection Standards, 69 Fed. Reg. 
67,681, 67,686 (Nov. 19, 2004) (explaining the Department’s decision to remove a number 
of rulemakings from its agenda in light of a reprioritization of the agency’s agenda that 
flowed from the new Administration’s goals). 
261.  In denying the rulemaking petition that was at issue in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 
(2007), the EPA did attempt to explain its denial in part by invoking a consistency and 
uniformity rationale: it stressed that it wanted to avoid regulating in a piecemeal fashion 
and stepping on the President’s own foreign policy initiatives. Id. at 513. The Court, 
however, rejected this as an inadequate explanation for the agency’s denial of the petition, 
noting that this and other explanations provided by the agency were “divorced from the 
statutory text.” Id. at 532. 
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rational policy explanations that legitimize (rather than taint) the agency 
decision. 
In addition, if the President campaigned on certain issues and thus came 
into office perceiving certain electoral mandates that would serve the country’s 
good, then the President likely would try to influence relevant agencies to act 
accordingly. This may well have been what was really going on in State Farm. 
There Reagan campaigned on the promise that he would respond to economic 
woes plaguing the auto industry by getting rid of “several thousand” federal 
regulations on American automakers,262 and the NHTSA under Reagan’s new 
leadership ultimately rescinded the prior Administration’s passive restraint 
regulations to better align with his promises and goals.263 
Where, as in these situations, a perceived electoral mandate exists and the 
President embraces the mandate by directing agency action in accord with the 
mandate and within the confines of the relevant statutes, it would be entirely 
reasonable for an agency to justify a decision based in part on the President’s 
embrace of the mandate and for courts to accept that justification. In such a 
situation, the President would be identifying the existence of the electoral 
mandate that he believes serves the public good and accepting political 
responsibility for implementing the mandate. Thus, the agency would not be 
faced with the task of trying to read the political “tea leaves” on its own. 
Rather, the agency would merely be seeking to align its own policymaking 
decisions with the President’s own priorities, promises, and goals. 
 
262.  Lou Cannon & David S. Broder, Reagan Vows To Try To Halt ‘Deluge’ of Japanese Autos, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1980, at A2 (“Ronald Reagan campaigned for Democratic votes in the 
recession-ridden auto capital today and said that as president he would try to get rid of 
‘several thousand’ federal regulations on American automakers and move to halt the ‘deluge’ 
of Japanese auto imports.”); see also Lucia Mouat, Automakers’ Plea to Reagan Leadership: Less 
Regulation, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 26, 1980, at 6 (“Hopes are high among US 
automakers that the Reagan administration will conduct an early, hard-hitting assault on 
what they see as questionable and costly safety and environmental regulations affecting 
them.”); Hedrick Smith, Republicans Gather in Detroit for Start of National Parley, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 13, 1980, at S1 (reporting that while Reagan was campaigning for President, he 
released a “four-point economic recovery program keyed to the automobile industry and 
aimed at using recession-bound Detroit to underscore the nation’s economic plight under 
President Carter”). 
263.  See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the NHTSA’s change 
in views “seem[ed] to be related to the election of a new President of a different political 
party”). See generally State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Dep’t of Transp., 680 F.2d 206, 213 
(D.C. Cir. 1982) (noting that the NHTSA’s proposal of the possible rescission was 
“announced by the White House Press Office on April 6, 1981, as part of a larger package of 
economic recovery measures”). 
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Of course, presidential prodding should not be allowed to help explain 
agency action where the President directs an agency to act in a way that would 
flout congressional will as set forth in the statute being implemented,264 or 
where the President asks the agency to act in a way that would conflict with the 
existing evidence. The results of some decisions are driven by science or law 
and thus should be unconnected to political judgment.265 For example, it 
would clearly be inappropriate for an agency charged with implementing a 
statute that forecloses a cost-benefit analysis to apply a cost-benefit analysis 
and to attempt to justify its decision by relying upon a presidential directive 
asking it to look to economic efficiency.266 It would likewise be inappropriate for 
a new Republican administration in the course of interpreting a statute that 
requires price regulation to reject arguments for lower prices simply because it 
doesn’t believe in price regulation. Conversely, it would be wholly appropriate 
for an agency to justify a decision to consider economic costs in choosing Rule 
A over Rule B where the President encouraged the agency to engage in a cost-
benefit analysis and where nothing in the relevant statute being implemented 
precluded the agency from engaging in an economic cost-benefit calculation 
(e.g., where the statute focused primarily on social benefits but was silent 
about balancing economic interests). 
2. Communications from Other Executive Officials 
Directions from the President himself are not the only type of presidential 
communications that agencies might reasonably rely upon: directions from 
executive officials that have presidential authority behind them, such as 
 
264.  Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that an administrative 
rulemaking may be overturned on the grounds of political pressure if “the content of the 
pressure . . . is designed to force [the agency] to decide upon factors not made relevant by 
Congress in the applicable statute” and if the agency’s determination was actually affected by 
the “extraneous considerations”) (emphasis added). 
265.  See Kagan, supra note 4, at 2352 (noting that “some hesitation is warranted” in allowing a 
presidential administration to influence agency decisions that are “most scientific or 
otherwise technical in nature and, as such, least connected to political judgment”).  
266.  Cf. 1 PIERCE, supra note 138, § 7.9, at 501 (“OMB cannot order an agency to base its decisions 
on a cost-benefit analysis . . . if Congress has explicitly required the agency to base its 
decisions on a standard that is inherently inconsistent with that analysis.”). 
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authorized directions from the President’s Chief of Staff267 or the Vice 
President,268 also should be given a place.269 
When President Bush entered office in January 2001, for example, his Chief 
of Staff Andrew Card issued a memorandum to agency heads that, among 
other things, directed them not to send any proposed or final regulations to the 
Office of the Federal Register for publication “unless and until a department or 
agency head appointed by the President after noon on January 20, 2001, 
reviews and approves the regulatory action.”270 The memorandum also 
directed agency heads to withdraw any regulations that had been sent to the 
Office of the Federal Register but not yet published and to temporarily 
postpone the effective date of any regulations that had been published but that 
had not yet taken effect.271 Similarly, when President Obama entered the White 
House, his Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel issued a memo to the heads of 
executive departments and agencies halting the implementation of new and 
proposed regulations.272 Even though these memos came from the Presidents’ 
 
267.  See, e.g., Memorandum from Andrew H. Card, Jr., Assistant to the President and Chief of 
Staff, to Heads and Acting Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 66 Fed. Reg. 
7702 (Jan. 24, 2001). 
268.  See, e.g., Statement of Regulatory and Deregulatory Priorities, 65 Fed. Reg. 73,453, 73,460 
(Nov. 30, 2000) (noting that an initiative involving chemicals “was announced by the Vice 
President on EPA’s Earth Day 1988 in response to the finding that most commercial 
chemicals have very little, if any, publicly available toxicity information on which to make 
sound judgments about potential risks”). 
269.  If an executive official issuing a directive to an agency is low ranking, it may be hard to show 
that the official is actually speaking for the President or that the official is subject to 
presidential control. See generally Verkuil, supra note 254, at 947 (noting that contact 
between lower level aides and assistants “bears a heavier burden of justification since it is 
more removed from direct presidential control”). This might undercut the rationality of an 
agency’s reliance on the official’s directions since the official may not represent the views of 
the President and may not be subject to political control and accountability. 
270.  Memorandum from Andrew H. Card, Jr., supra note 267. 
271.  This type of instruction to agency heads—to withhold proposed regulations when there is a 
change in administrations—is quite common. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Veneman, 469 
F.3d 826, 850 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“Withholding proposed 
regulations that are final but for publication in the Federal Register seems to be common 
when there is a change in administrations.”), vacated, 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007); see also 
Marianne Koral Smythe, Judicial Review of Rule Rescissions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1928, 1931 
n.18 (1984) (noting that “[o]ne of Reagan’s first actions on taking office was to impose a 
60-day freeze on about 100” of the rules issued on the eve of Carter’s last days in office). 
Upon entering the White House this year, President Obama continued this trend. See Jim 
Tankersley, Bush-era Acts Elude Reversal by Obama, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 22, 2009, at 26 (“Like 
Bush, Obama took office and immediately froze federal regulations not yet finalized.”). 
272.  See Memorandum from Rahm Emanuel, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff, to 
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4435 (Jan. 26, 2009). 
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Chiefs of Staff rather than directly from the mouths of the Presidents, they are 
precisely the type of influence from the executive branch that—if openly 
disclosed in an agency’s rulemaking proceeding—should be allowed to help 
justify an agency’s decision, such as an agency’s decision to withdraw a 
proposed rule.273 
The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) stands as 
another possible source of nondirect presidential influence. OIRA is part of the 
White House’s OMB, which assists the President in ensuring that “agency 
reports, rules, testimony, and proposed legislation are consistent with the 
President’s Budget and with Administration policies.”274 Although OIRA 
generally exercises a type of supervisory authority over agencies by reviewing 
regulatory decisions already initiated by agencies, OIRA in 2001 began to play 
a role in directing agency priorities and prompting agencies to take action by 
issuing “prompt letters.”275 Prompt letters are used to suggest OIRA’s view that 
a particular matter needs agency attention, that a rulemaking proceeding needs 
to be accelerated, or that an existing rule might call for rescission or 
modification.276 Given that prompt letters communicate the views of the 
executive branch to agencies in a transparent manner that permits public 
scrutiny and debate,277 prompt letters further accountable and transparent 
decisionmaking. Prompt letters, accordingly, serve as a very useful example of a 
source of political influence that—if openly disclosed in an agency’s rulemaking 
record—could appropriately and rationally help to explain an agency 
rulemaking decision, such as a decision to modify or rescind an existing rule. 
 
273.  See Air Quality, Chemical Substances, and Respiratory Protection Standards, 69 Fed. Reg. 
67,681, 67,686 (Nov. 19, 2004) (citing the Card Memorandum as a reason the agency had 
reprioritized its agenda, resulting in a drop in the total number of rulemaking projects on 
the agency’s agenda from 145 in the fall of 2000 to just 79 by the fall of 2003). 
274.  See OMB’s Mission, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/organization_role (last visited Sept. 
5, 2009) (describing the mission of OMB). 
275.  See Robin Kundis Craig, The Bush Administration’s Use and Abuse of Rulemaking, Part I: The 
Rise of OIRA, 28 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Summer 2003, at 8 (“OIRA has recently created, 
out of no recognizable legal authority, the ‘prompt letter’—a letter written to an 
administrative agency requesting that it take specific regulatory actions.”); see also Office of 
Management and Budget News Release 2001-35, OMB Encourages Lifesaving Actions by 
Regulators (Sept. 18, 2001), http://www.reginfo.gov/public/prompt/2001-35.html (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2009) (describing how “[t]he prompt letter is a new tool created by OIRA’s 
Administrator, John D. Graham, to highlight issues that may warrant the attention of 
regulators”). 
276.  Introduction to the Regulatory Plan and the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and 
Deregulatory Actions, 70 Fed. Reg. 64,079, 64,087 (Oct. 31, 2005) (describing how “OIRA’s 
first set of prompts suggested lifesaving opportunities at FDA, NHTSA, OSHA and EPA”). 
277.  Id. 
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3. Congressional Oversight 
The President and those who speak for the President are not the only 
possible sources of political influences that might be aimed at agency 
rulemaking decisions: Congress too plays an important role in overseeing and 
shaping rulemaking decisions.278 Thus, particularly with respect to 
independent agencies, congressional influences could serve as yet another 
possible source of political influence that—if openly disclosed—could help to 
adequately explain an agency’s rulemaking decision for purposes of arbitrary 
and capricious review. 
Members of Congress, for example, are free (just like any interested 
member of the public would be) to file written comments with an agency 
during a notice-and-comment rulemaking proceeding in an attempt to 
influence the agency’s outcome.279 Alternatively, congressional committees 
composed of certain members of Congress might hold oversight hearings to try 
to prod an agency to act one way or another or to try to prod an agency into 
action. In addition, certain members of Congress might choose to engage in 
informal attempts to influence an agency, such as by simply calling up or 
meeting with the decisionmakers at the agency and encouraging the agency to 
act in a certain way. 
Agencies are likely to pay attention to all of these different sorts of 
congressional communications because it is, after all, Congress that ultimately 
decides what powers to delegate to the agency and what type of funding the 
agency will receive. However, whether agencies ought to pay attention to these 
sorts of congressional influences (and whether such influences ought to be 
 
278.  See supra notes 152-155 and accompanying text. 
279.  Because such comments are part of the rulemaking record and form part of the public 
comments that agencies must adequately respond to when the APA applies, see 5 U.S.C. § 
553(c) (2006), it is common to see agencies acknowledge the filing of such public comments 
by congressmen. See, e.g., Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Pork, Lamb, 
Chicken, Goat Meat, Perishable Agricultural Commodities, Peanuts, Pecans, Ginseng, and 
Macadamia Nuts, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,106, 45,114 (Aug. 1, 2008) (noting the receipt of “5,600 
timely comments from consumers, retailers, foreign governments, producers, wholesalers, 
manufacturers, distributors, members of Congress, trade associations and other interested 
parties”) (emphasis added); Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Rearview Mirrors, 73 
Fed. Reg. 42,309, 42,310 (July 21, 2008) (noting comments filed by two members of 
Congress); Card Format Passport; Changes to Passport Fee Schedule, 72 Fed. Reg. 74,169, 
74,170 (Dec. 31, 2007) (“Among those submitting comments were: four Members of 
Congress, Senators Hillary Clinton and Charles Schumer of New York, Senator Patrick 
Leahy of Vermont, and Representative Louise Slaughter of New York.”). Thus, agencies’ 
willingness to mention and discuss public congressional comments stands as an exception to 
the normal rule that agencies will sweep political influences under the rug. 
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brought out into the open) is likely to be more controversial than whether 
agencies ought to be encouraged to openly rely upon presidential influences. 
Specifically, two objections might be raised if agencies openly acknowledged 
their reliance on congressional influences. 
First, open reliance on congressional influences is likely to incite more 
controversy than reliance on presidential influences because the current model 
of agency decisionmaking often is described as hinging on the notion that 
administrative agencies (and their place in our tripartite constitutional 
structure) can best be legitimized by placing agencies under the President’s 
control. In other words, allowing administrative agencies to resolve wide-
ranging policy decisions is often viewed as justifiable not because of Congress’s 
influence over agencies but rather because agency officials “are accountable to 
the people through their relationship with the politically accountable 
President.”280 
Even “presidentialists,”281 however, do not claim as a factual matter that 
Congress exerts no control over administrative agencies. To the contrary, 
Congress (and individual congressmen as well as committees of congressmen) 
play a significant role in overseeing the administrative state through formal 
and informal mechanisms,282 and thus administrative agencies can be seen as 
deriving their legitimacy from both the President and Congress. This means 
that even if the presidential control model of agency decisionmaking is not 
necessarily furthered by allowing congressional influences to explain agency 
decisions for purposes of arbitrary and capricious review, the political control 
model more generally certainly would be. 
A second objection that could be levied against allowing congressional 
influences to play an open role might revolve around the fact that the President 
is a unitary official who can speak with one voice whereas Congress consists of 
535 voting members. Put another way, it might be more difficult for courts to 
determine precisely when congressional influences should be viewed as a 
permissible explanation and when they should not be. In the end, the courts 
likely would be faced with the task of assessing the weight due to congressional 
 
280.  1 PIERCE, supra note 138, § 1.7, at 26; see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984) (noting that “[w]hile agencies are not directly 
accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this 
political branch of Government to make such policy choices”). 
281.  See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
282.  See supra notes 152-155 and accompanying text; see also Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of 
Accountability and Political Review of Agency Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1076-78 (2001) 
(discussing the mechanisms through which Congress exercises oversight over agency 
rulemaking). 
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influences on a case-by-case basis.283 In engaging in this case specific task, the 
courts would need to deem some kinds of influences permissible and others 
impermissible. For example, a group of congressmen’s comments on the 
substance of a proposed rule (e.g., comments that help to explain Congress’s 
intent in a particular statute) clearly should be found to fall on the line of 
permissible considerations that might help to explain an agency decision.284 
At the other extreme, one congressman’s “hard-ball” threats made through 
the back door to an executive agency (e.g., a threat that if the agency proceeds 
with a certain rule, the congressman will withhold all financial support for 
other unrelated programs) should not be allowed to help adequately explain an 
agency decision. Such an influence would not only fail to be a factor that 
Congress intended to be logically related to the agency’s decision,285 but it also 
would fail to reinforce the positive attributes of political influences, such as 
representativeness and accountability.286 Similarly, comments made by 
congressmen who were outvoted in writing the bill authorizing a rulemaking 
would need to be ruled out or at least minimized when compared to comments 
made by congressmen who served as conferees of the bill. 
D.  Types of Rulemaking Proceedings in Which Political Factors Might        
Appropriately Play a Role 
With an understanding of what types of political influences might most 
appropriately count as valid factors justifying an agency’s rulemaking decision, 
 
283.  Although this might sound like a difficult task to impose on the courts, it is not all that 
different from how courts currently give different weight to different types of legislative 
history when construing statutes—giving more weight, for example, to committee reports 
than to other types of legislative history. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 n.7 
(1986) (“We have repeatedly recognized that the authoritative source for legislative intent 
lies in the Committee Reports on the bill.”). 
284.  Cf. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d 355, 358-59 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(noting that the agency relied upon comments filed by eleven members of Congress who 
had served as conferees on the statutory amendments at issue). 
285.  Cf. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 409 & n.539 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that it would 
be improper for a congressman to exert pressure on an agency that would force the agency 
to decide an issue based on “factors not made relevant by Congress in the applicable 
statute”); D.C. Fed’n of Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1972) 
(suggesting that it would be improper for the Secretary of Transportation to make a 
determination that a proposed bridge should be part of an interstate highway system 
because of a congressman’s statements to the effect that money earmarked for another 
project would be withheld unless the Secretary approved the bridge). 
286.  Cf. EDLEY, supra note 4, at 196-97 (noting that political influences should be accepted as 
“good politics” only where they “embody the positive attributes like representativeness and 
accountability”). 
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the final question to consider in terms of the mechanics of giving politics an 
accepted place is this: In what rulemaking contexts might courts most 
appropriately view agency reliance on political factors as a positive factor rather 
than as a danger signal? Rulemaking decisions can arise in a variety of contexts 
(both regulatory and deregulatory), including denials of petitions to initiate 
rulemaking proceedings, the promulgation of final rules, the rescission of final 
rules, and the withdrawal of proposed rules. Some types of rulemaking 
decisions might be viewed as more appropriately turning on political influences 
than others.287 
1. Denials of Rulemaking Petitions 
An agency’s denial of a petition asking the agency to initiate a discretionary 
rulemaking proceeding presents perhaps the clearest example of a type of 
agency decision that could very properly turn on political considerations. 
Agencies are often given broad rulemaking powers yet given wide discretion to 
decide whether and when to initiate rulemaking proceedings.288 Agencies, 
however, may be prodded into action by interested parties who invoke Section 
553(e) of the APA, which provides: “Each agency shall give an interested person 
the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”289 If an 
agency receives a petition asking it to initiate rulemaking proceedings but 
ultimately decides to deny the petition, section 555(e) of the APA requires the 
agency to give prompt notice of the denial, explaining the grounds for the 
denial.290 
 
287.  The only types of rulemaking proceedings considered here are rulemakings that would 
count as informal proceedings. In other words, “formal” rulemaking proceedings subject to 
sections 556 and 557 of the APA (rather than section 553) are not considered here because 
section 557 expressly precludes ex parte contacts in the context of formal rulemaking. See 5 
U.S.C. § 557(d)(1) (2006) (prohibiting ex parte contacts); see also Verkuil, supra note 254, at 
968 (discussing the prohibition placed on ex parte contacts in formal rulemaking 
proceedings). Rulemaking today, however, overwhelmingly takes place under the rubric of 
informal notice-and-comment rulemaking, not formal rulemaking. 
288.  Cf. Merrill & Watts, supra note 158, at 504-19 (discussing numerous statutes that give 
agencies broad general grants of rulemaking power). 
289.  5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2006). In addition to the default provisions of the APA, some statutes 
specifically provide for a “right to petition for rulemaking, and some of these statutes specify 
procedures to be followed in the petitioning process.” Petitions for Rulemaking 
(Recommendation No. 86-6 n.1), 1 C.F.R. § 305.86-6 (1987). 
290.  5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2006) (“Except in affirming a prior denial or when the denial is self-
explanatory, the notice shall be accompanied by a brief statement of the grounds for 
denial.”). 
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Consistent with the prevailing technocratic and expertise-driven vision of 
agencies’ reason-giving duties, agencies today tend to explain their denials of 
rulemaking petitions not by openly mentioning influences from political actors 
but rather by referencing the agency’s statutory authority, the underlying 
statutory purposes, the desirability of proceeding on a case-by-case basis rather 
than through generally applicable policy, the necessity or desirability of 
statutory revisions, the lack of evidence of a problem warranting federal 
intervention, and sometimes the availability of agency resources.291 For 
example, even when the EPA denied the politically charged rulemaking petition 
at issue in Massachusetts v. EPA,292 the EPA tried to explain its decision first in 
statutory terms and only then in policy-driven terms that focused heavily on 
alleged scientific uncertainty facing the agency.293 Mention was made of the 
EPA’s desire to avoid stepping on the President’s own foreign policy initiatives 
involving global warming;294 however, the EPA’s explanation of its denial of 
the rulemaking petition—consistent with the prevailing expertise-based view 
of agency decisionmaking—focused heavily on statutory as well as scientific 
factors.295 
Despite the current tendency of agencies to avoid justifying rulemaking 
denials by relying upon communications from political actors, these sorts of 
political influences are precisely the kinds of influences that might 
appropriately help to explain an agency’s denial of a rulemaking petition. Just 
 
291.  See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. § 490.6 (2009) (listing reasons why the Department of Energy might 
deny a rulemaking petition); 11 C.F.R. § 200.5 (2009) (listing reasons that might explain 
why the Federal Election Commission chooses to act a certain way on a petition for 
rulemaking); see also Denial of Petition for Rulemaking; Federal Motor Vehicle Safety 
Standards, 61 Fed. Reg. 38,135 (proposed July 23, 1996) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) 
(denying the rulemaking petition, among other reasons, because of the lack of evidence of a 
significant safety problem that would warrant federal intervention). 
292.  549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
293.  Id. at 511-14; see also Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 
Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,930 (Sept. 8, 2003) (“Although there have been substantial advances in 
climate change science, there continue to be important uncertainties in our understanding of 
the factors that may affect future climate change and how it should be addressed.”). 
294.  Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 513-14; see also Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles 
and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,931 (noting that “the President has laid out a comprehensive 
approach to climate change that calls for near-term voluntary actions and incentives along 
with programs aimed at reducing scientific uncertainties and encouraging technological 
development so that the government may effectively and efficiently address the global 
climate change issue over the long term”). 
295.  But see Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 
52,929 (discussing the President’s attempts to deal with climate change and noting that the 
EPA did “agree with the President that ‘we must address the issue of global climate 
change’”). 
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as Congress must weigh competing interests and competing priorities when 
deciding which issues to tackle via legislation, agencies faced with rulemaking 
petitions asking them to regulate inevitably must weigh competing agency 
priorities against limited agency personnel, budgets, and time.296 This sort of 
priority-setting process is exactly the type of decision that political actors, 
including the President, are likely to try to influence to ensure the consistency 
of agency actions with overall government policy and priorities.297 
To consider how this might play out, think once again about Judge Pollak’s 
concurring opinion in UAW v. Chao.298 There, as you will remember, in 2003, 
OSHA denied a rulemaking petition filed in 1993 asking it to promulgate a rule 
that would have established a standard for metalworking fluids. Although 
OSHA’s decision to deny the petition seemed inconsistent with the agency’s 
prior 1995 decision to designate metalworking fluids as a high agency priority, 
the Third Circuit ultimately upheld the denial of the petition, stressing that the 
decision was not arbitrary and capricious “because OSHA weighed the scientific 
evidence of health hazards . . . against its other regulatory priorities” and 
“identified the reasons why regulating . . . [would] require an ‘enormous’ 
allocation of resources.”299 Judge Pollak’s concurring opinion took things a 
step further: he agreed with the majority that the decision was not arbitrary, 
but he explained that what was really at stake in the case was “a change in 
regulatory policy coincident with a change in administration.”300 Specifically, 
Judge Pollak highlighted the fact that OSHA’s counsel admitted at oral 
argument that “‘[t]he metalworking fluids . . . were listed as a high priority 
only following the priority-setting process of a prior administration . . . and 
those priorities are different than the current ones.’”301 
Judge Pollak’s willingness to credit what appears to be an oral, post hoc 
justification offered by agency counsel (as opposed to requiring the agency to 
 
296.  See generally Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1979) 
(“An agency’s discretionary decision not to regulate a given activity is inevitably based, in 
large measure, on factors . . . [such as] internal management considerations as to budget 
and personnel; evaluations of its own competence; [and] weighing of competing policies 
within a broad statutory framework.”). 
297.  Cf. NHTSA Vehicle Safety Rulemaking and Supporting Research: Calendar Years 2003-
2006, 68 Fed. Reg. 43,972, 43,973 (July 25, 2003) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571) 
(“Agency priorities emanate from many sources, including . . . Executive initiatives, [and] 
Congressional interest and mandates . . . .”). 
298.  361 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2004); see also supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Chao case). 
299.  Chao, 361 F.3d at 255. 
300.  Id. at 256 (Pollak, J., concurring). 
301.  Id. (quoting the attorney representing Chao). 
WATTS_119_2.DOC  
proposing a place for politics 
69 
 
justify its decision based solely on the evidence and reasoning disclosed in the 
agency’s rulemaking record) is not ideal in the sense that it undercuts open, 
transparent agency reasoning. It also runs against the well-settled rule that 
agency actions must be upheld based on the reasons actually articulated by the 
agency itself, not by counsel’s post-hoc rationalizations for the agency.302 Judge 
Pollak, however, was on the right track in terms of his general willingness to 
acknowledge and embrace the role that political factors may play in agency 
denials of rulemaking petitions. 
Other judges too have at least implicitly recognized that political 
considerations, such as changes in administrations or decisions about how best 
to direct limited agency resources, play a role in agency denials of rulemaking 
petitions.303 Generally, however, courts have allowed the political and policy-
driven influences swirling around rulemaking petitions to convince them that 
when it comes to discretionary rulemaking proceedings, denials of rulemaking 
petitions should be subject to only the most limited and deferential review.304 
Courts, accordingly, have not thought to incentivize agencies to openly and 
transparently disclose in their rulemaking records the political influences 
bubbling under the surface of rulemaking denials. This should change. The 
 
302.  See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983) 
(“[C]ourts may not accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalizations for agency action. . . . 
It is well-established than an agency’s action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis 
articulated by the agency itself.”); SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943) 
(noting that “an administrative order must be judged” solely “upon [those grounds] which 
the record discloses that its action was based”); Yale-New Haven Hosp. v. Leavitt, 470 F.3d 
71, 81 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Generally speaking, after-the-fact rationalization for agency action is 
disfavored.”). 
303.  See, e.g., Chao, 361 F.3d at 255-56 (rejecting the claim that OSHA acted in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner in denying rulemaking petition where OSHA denied the petition in part 
because OSHA has “limited resources” and where it named three “more pressing” 
priorities); Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1979) 
(stating that “[a]n agency’s discretionary decision not to regulate a given activity is 
inevitably based, in large measure, on factors not inherently susceptible to judicial 
resolution,” such as considerations as to budget and personnel). But see Pub. Citizen Health 
Research Group v. Chao, 314 F.3d 143 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting the notion that competing 
agency priorities could justify a nine year delay in adopting a new workplace exposure 
standard). 
304.  See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527-28 (2007) (holding that refusals to grant 
rulemaking petitions are susceptible only to judicial review that is “extremely limited” and 
“highly deferential” (quoting Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass’n of Am. v. United 
States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989))); see also Cellnet Commc’n, Inc. v. FCC, 965 F.2d 
1106, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“[A]n agency’s refusal to initiate a rulemaking is evaluated with 
a deference so broad as to make the process akin to non-reviewability.”); Am. Horse 
Protection Ass’n v. Lyng, 812 F.2d 1, 3-4 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting deferential review that 
applies when reviewing an agency’s refusal to initiate a rulemaking). 
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decision about whether or not to regulate (i.e., to make law) is quintessentially 
“legislative” in nature. Evidence and expertise, accordingly, may not be 
dispositive in explaining such decisions—making it all the more appropriate for 
rulemaking agencies acting as mini legislatures to rely upon political influences 
when deciding whether or not to regulate in the first place.305 
2. Withdrawals of Proposed Rules 
Withdrawals of discretionary rules (i.e., rules that an agency is under no 
statutory duty to enact) that have been proposed but that have not yet been 
adopted provide another good example of a type of rulemaking that is 
quintessentially legislative in nature and that might rationally turn on political 
influences. Much like denials of rulemaking petitions, withdrawals of proposed 
discretionary rules—especially the withdrawal of rules proposed under a prior 
administration—may well turn on political calculations and influences, such as 
administration priorities and overall agenda setting.306 Evidence and science 
often will not be dispositive. This becomes quite clear when one considers how 
common it has become for new presidents coming into office to order the 
withholding of regulations proposed under the prior presidential 
administration that are final but for publication in the Federal Register.307 
 
305.  Cf. SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 117-18 (“We never say that Congress has a duty to pass a 
particular law or indeed any laws at all. So an agency exercising Congress’s delegated law-
making powers had no such duty either.”). 
306.  See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Veneman, 469 F.3d 826, 850 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, 
J., dissenting) (“Absent a statutory duty to act, an agency need not adopt regulations, even if 
all public comments submitted favor them . . . . The agency may decide not to adopt 
regulations because of a change in administrations, or some other change in policy.”), 
vacated by 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007); Notice of Withdrawal of Proposed Rulemaking, 69 
Fed. Reg. 13,805 (Mar. 24, 2004) (“We have decided to terminate the rulemaking for the 
administrative rewrite of headlighting requirements, due to other regulatory priorities and 
limited agency resources.”). 
307.  See generally 469 F.3d at 850 n.6 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (noting the practice of presidents 
coming into office and withholding final publication of regulations proposed under prior 
administrations); Chen v. INS, 95 F.3d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 1996) (“President Clinton, 
following his inauguration on January 22, 1993, directed his newly appointed director of the 
Office of Management and Budget to issue a memorandum requesting that each agency 
withdraw from the Federal Register regulations that had not yet been published.”); 
Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1236 n.6 (D. Idaho 2001) (“On 
January 20, 2001, President Bush issued an order postponing by sixty (60) days the effective 
date of all of the Clinton Administration’s 11th hour regulations and rules that had not yet 
been implemented.”); Dabney v. Reagan, 542 F. Supp. 756, 760 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“Shortly 
after taking office, President Reagan directed the heads of all Executive Departments to 
postpone all pending regulations.”). 
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President Obama did this upon entering the White House in 2009, and 
President Bush did the same thing in 2001.308 
For a good example of how an agency might appropriately justify its 
withdrawal of a proposed rule based on political considerations, consider 
another example discussed earlier: the MSHA’s withdrawal of a proposed rule 
that would have, among other things, “established permissible exposure limits” 
and monitoring methods for substances that might adversely affect the health 
of miners.309 In its detailed explanation of its rule withdrawal, the MSHA 
explained that it had revisited and reprioritized the agency’s agenda consistent 
with a “federal agency-wide initiative intended to maintain sound regulatory 
practice,” which was announced by President Bush’s Chief of Staff Andrew 
Card in a written memorandum to agency heads.310 Notably, in justifying why 
this President-driven reprioritization should count as an “adequate” 
explanation for its decision, the MSHA drew directly from the views Judge 
Pollak set forth in his concurring opinion in Chao just one year earlier: 
“‘[T]here is nothing obscure, and nothing suspect about regulatory policy 
changes coincident with changes in administration,’” the MSHA explained, 
quoting from Judge Pollak.311 
3. Rule Rescissions 
Rescissions of discretionary rules stand as another type of rulemaking 
decision that might rationally and appropriately turn on political influences. 
Some rule rescissions—rather than relying entirely on factual conclusions 
about the ineffectiveness or obsolete nature of a rule—might appropriately 
reflect the fact that a change in administration has taken place and that the new 
administration does not wish to administer or enforce rules that run contrary 
to its own political choices, goals, and policies.312 If an agency rescinding a rule 
openly and transparently discloses its reliance on such political considerations 
 
308.  See Jim Tankersley, Bush-era Acts Elude Reversal by Obama, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 22, 2009, at C26 
(“Like Bush, Obama took office and immediately froze federal regulations not yet 
finalized.”). See generally supra note 271 and accompanying text (discussing the common 
practice of presidents coming into office and issuing instructions to agency heads to 
withhold regulations proposed under the prior administration). 
309.  See Air Quality, Chemical Substances, and Respiratory Protection Standards, 69 Fed. Reg. 
67,681 (Nov. 19, 2004) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pts. 56-58, 70-72, 75, and 90); see also 
supra notes 116-122 and accompanying text (discussing the MSHA’s withdrawal of its rule). 
310.  See 69 Fed. Reg. at 67,686 (citing Memorandum from Andrew H. Card, Jr., supra note 267). 
311.  Id. (citing UAW v. Chao, 361 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2004) (Pollak, J., concurring)). 
312.  See Smythe, supra note 271, at 1931-33 (describing how rule rescissions may be based in part 
on political change). 
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in explaining its decision to rescind the rule, then courts should embrace such 
an explanation as rational rather than treating it as a danger signal.313 
Take, for example, the “passive restraint” regulation rescinded by the 
NHTSA at issue in State Farm.314 Although the agency failed to acknowledge it 
openly, much of the explanation for the NHTSA’s rescission likely lay in the 
fact that President Reagan had recently come into office, and he sought to 
address the country’s economic woes by, among other things, achieving 
“regulatory relief” for the ailing automobile industry.315 If the NHTSA had 
openly disclosed its reliance on the Administration’s overall priorities in 
explaining its rescission of the detachable belt portion of the rule, the agency’s 
explanation should have been enough (combined with its focus on facts and 
logic) to constitute a reasonable and adequate explanation for the rescission of 
that portion of the standard.316 Similarly, had the NHTSA explicitly appealed 
to presidential priorities in addition to any relevant studies or facts in dealing 
with the possibility of an airbags-only option, then the NHTSA’s justification 
for refusing to pursue an airbags-only option should have been viewed as 
sufficient.317 
4. Promulgation of Final Rules 
A final (although somewhat messier) area in which political influences 
might help to explain an agency’s decision involves the promulgation of final 
rules. Clearly, if an agency is deciding between promulgating Rule A, B, or C 
and the relevant statute, evidence, and science would support only the selection 
of Rule A or B but not Rule C, then the agency should not be allowed to rely 
 
313.  See McKarcher, supra note 132, at 1369-70 (“There is nothing patently arbitrary or capricious 
about a newly elected administration exercising congressionally delegated discretion to 
implement [new] policy choices [that were] debated publicly for months or years leading up 
to the President’s election and presumably motivated the majority of voters to support the 
President eventually elected.”). 
314.  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
315.  See Smythe, supra note 271, at 1933 & n.32; cf. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting the change in presidential 
administration). 
316.  Cf. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 n.* (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(noting that a change in presidential administration is a perfectly reasonable basis for 
reappraising a rule and noting that in this case, “Congress has not required the agency to 
require passive restraints”). 
317.  The NHTSA’s downfall in the case, of course, was that it entirely failed to consider an 
airbags-only option. See Smythe, supra note 271, at 1933-35 (discussing how the NHSTA’s 
problem was its failure to meet even its minimal obligation to explain its rule rescission); see 
also supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text. 
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upon political considerations alone to select Rule C. Put another way, political 
considerations alone should not be allowed to justify the promulgation of a rule 
that conflicts with the existing evidence or with the statute itself.318 Allowing 
this would be to allow naked politics to trump science and/or to trump the law. 
However, if the relevant statutory provisions and the evidence would equally 
support the selection of either Rule A, B, or C, then it would be entirely rational 
for the agency to rely upon political influences in explaining why it chose Rule 
C over Rules A or B. 
A harder case might be presented if the relevant statute and evidence 
strongly supported the selection of Rule A but did not entirely foreclose the 
possibility of Rule B. In such a situation, could an agency rely upon political 
considerations, such as a presidential directive, in explaining why it ultimately 
chose Rule B over Rule A? The answer to this question should vary depending 
on the circumstances of the particular case involved. One relevant 
consideration would be the certainty of the factual evidence; the more 
uncertain the science, the more room for political considerations to tip the 
scales. Other very relevant considerations would be the content, form, and 
perceived significance of the political influences. For example, a publicly 
announced presidential directive ordering an agency to promulgate Rule B 
because it better aligns with the administration’s goals and comprehensive 
strategies should be viewed as much weightier and more capable of properly 
tipping the scales toward Rule B than a mere phone call made by a single 
congressman. This is because the presidential directive would help to reinforce 
positive attributes of politics, such as accountability and representativeness, 
whereas the congressional phone call would not. 
iv.  objections to giving politics a place 
The proposal that courts add political factors to the list of “valid” 
justifications for agency decisionmaking is open to criticism on a number of 
grounds. Five possible objections are considered here. Ultimately, however, 
none of them prove insurmountable. 
 
318.  Cf. Kagan, supra note 4, at 2356-57 (arguing that a strong presidential role is inappropriate 
where the agency decision is purely scientific in nature but is appropriate where agencies 
confront value-laden judgments that must be made in the face of “scientific uncertainty and 
competing public interests”). 
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A. The First-Mover Dilemma  
One major roadblock that could prevent politics from gaining an accepted 
role in rulemaking involves what could be thought of as a “first-mover” 
dilemma, or perhaps a type of “chicken-and-egg” problem.319 The specific 
dilemma is this: either courts or agencies will have to be the first mover. Will 
courts indicate a willingness to embrace political factors before agencies have 
openly started disclosing their reliance on politics, or will agencies need to 
move toward disclosing political factors first without knowing ahead of time if 
courts will accept such factors? Given how expensive and time-consuming the 
rulemaking process is today, agencies might well be unwilling to render their 
decisions vulnerable to attack by openly disclosing political factors without first 
knowing whether courts are likely to embrace political considerations. 
Likewise, courts might be disinclined to send abstract signals to agencies on the 
issue, or perhaps courts would view it as inappropriate to speculate in dicta 
about how they might handle a situation that may or may not come along in 
the future. 
Perhaps the simplest solution to this problem would be for a bold agency to 
set aside its fears and to decide to act as a “guinea pig” by openly relying upon 
political factors in a rulemaking proceeding, thereby giving the courts an 
opportunity to embrace politics. At first blush, this solution might seem quite 
improbable given the risks of reversal that the agency would be accepting. Yet 
upon closer examination, the solution may not actually be all that improbable. 
One reason why is that agencies should have an incentive to see politics 
affirmatively embraced as an appropriate factor in rulemaking decisions: if 
courts accept political factors under arbitrary and capricious review, then 
agencies will gain yet one more reason why they can claim an entitlement to 
deference by the courts. 
To play it safe, agencies might well want to begin by relying upon political 
factors in narrow situations where courts are more likely to see the value of 
political judgments—such as denials of rulemaking petitions or withdrawals of 
proposed rules based upon clearly articulated administration priorities (such as 
a presidential directive ordering an agency to withdraw a proposed rule that 
conflicts with the administration’s goals and comprehensive strategy).320 If 
 
319.  See EDLEY, supra note 4, at 192 (using the term “chicken-and-egg problem”). 
320.  Cf. UAW v. Chao, 361 F.3d 249, 256 (3d Cir. 2004) (Pollak, J., concurring) (embracing 
change in administration as a valid reason supporting agency decision in the context of an 
agency’s denial of a discretionary rulemaking petition); Air Quality, Chemical Substances, 
and Respiratory Protection Standards, 69 Fed. Reg. 67,681, 67,686 (Nov. 19, 2004) 
(explaining the withdrawal of the proposed rule by noting that “each administration 
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agencies can get courts to routinely accept political factors in those specific 
contexts, then they might feel more comfortable testing the waters in broader 
contexts later on. 
Another reason why it actually might not be all that implausible to see 
agencies begin to openly rely upon political factors is that some judges and 
agencies already have begun to plant the seeds for giving politics some place in 
agency decisionmaking.321 Take, for example, the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Fox, which suggests willingness on the part of at least some 
members of the Court to allow political influences to play some role in agency 
decisionmaking.322 Or take Judge Pollak’s concurrence in the Third Circuit’s 
recent Chao decision discussed earlier.323 In Chao, Judge Pollak signaled his 
willingness to embrace politics, and at least one agency (the MSHA) has 
already relied upon Judge Pollak’s view that “there is nothing obscure, and 
nothing suspect about regulatory policy changes coincident with changes in 
administration.”324 Or consider the final rule adopting fuel efficiency standards 
recently issued by the NHTSA under the Obama Administration, which openly 
acknowledges the role that presidential directions and goals played in the 
agency’s decision-making process.325 
 
embraces its own priority-setting process and regulatory philosophy such that items 
considered priority by one administration may not be so by another administration”). 
321.  See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Chao, 361 F.3d at 256 (Pollak, J., concurring); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) (“[A]n agency to which Congress has delegated 
policy-making responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon 
the incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.”); Sierra Club 
v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“The court recognizes the basic need of the 
President and his White House staff to monitor the consistency of executive agency 
regulations with Administration policy.”). But see Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 
547 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting in the context of review of an FDA decision involving the 
emergency contraceptive Plan B that there was “unusual involvement of the White House” 
and that this was “not the norm”). 
322.  FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800 (2009). 
323.  See Chao, 361 F.3d at 256; see also supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Chao case). 
324.  See Air Quality, Chemical Substances, and Respiratory Protection Standards, 69 Fed. Reg. 
at 67,686 (citing Chao, 361 F.3d at 249 (Pollak, J., concurring)). 
325.  See Department of Transportation, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 
Average Fuel Economy Standards Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Model Year 2011, 74 
Fed. Reg. 14,196 (Mar. 30, 2009). 
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B. Balancing The Carrot With A Stick 
Some might object to the proposal set forth here because the “carrot” 
offered to agencies (i.e., the additional reason for deference) is not balanced by 
a “stick.” Agencies, in other words, are given the best of both worlds: they 
could choose to disclose political influences when it would help give them an 
additional reason to claim deference, or they could choose to ignore political 
influences when such influences might be viewed as improper. For example, 
agencies might be more willing to disclose publicly available directives from 
the President and less willing to disclose back door congressional pressure that 
could be viewed as inappropriate political meddling. 
The clearest way to solve this problem might well be to create an express 
“stick” to affirmatively require agencies to disclose political influences. Such an 
affirmative disclosure requirement, however, would mean that courts would be 
forced to attempt to determine when political communications did occur and 
when they did not occur. This would be difficult for courts to do—at least in 
today’s statutory environment—given that section 553 of the APA does not 
require that informal, ex parte communications, such as communications from 
the White House to executive agencies, be docketed in notice-and-comment 
rulemaking records.326 Thus, an affirmative requirement that agencies disclose 
political communications would likely require an amendment to the APA or the 
enactment of a new statute that affirmatively requires disclosure of certain 
political influences, such as significant executive supervision. Certainly, this 
type of statutory disclosure requirement is a possibility. Professor Nina 
Mendelson, for example, argues in a forthcoming article that such an 
affirmative disclosure requirement would be superior to addressing the issue of 
politics solely through judicial review.327 However, such a statutory change 
would likely face various hurdles—including claims of executive privilege.328 
 
326.  As the D.C. Circuit has explained, the APA prohibits ex parte contacts only “in an 
adjudication or rulemaking ‘required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity 
for an agency hearing.’” Dist. No. 1, Pac. Coast Dist. v. Mar. Adm’n, 215 F.3d 37, 42 (2000) 
(citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(c), 554(a), 557(d) (2000)). It, accordingly, would likely violate 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 
(1978), if courts instructed agencies to disclose all ex parte contacts from political actors in 
informal rulemaking proceedings. See Dist. No.1, Pac. Coast Dist., 215 F.3d at 43. 
327.  See Mendelson, supra note 123, at 4, 39 (“[R]ather than addressing the issue [of politics] 
indirectly through judicial review, I suggest that we proceed directly to regulating procedure 
[by requiring] . . . that a significant agency decision include at least a summary of the 
substance of executive supervision.”). 
328.  See generally 1 PIERCE, supra note 138, § 7.9, at 502 (noting that Congress has “considered 
passage of a statute that would require public disclosure of all communications between 
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Even if a new statutory requirement forcing agencies to disclose political 
influences does not materialize anytime soon, courts might nonetheless be able 
to create a type of “stick” to balance the “carrot” by essentially penalizing 
agencies for decisions that seem to be based upon undisclosed, secret political 
influences—akin to how the courts presently are willing to penalize agencies 
for making decisions that seem to be based upon undisclosed expert studies or 
evidence.329 This, for instance, could be what happened in State Farm. There, 
the NHTSA failed to acknowledge political influences and thus the Court’s 
opinion could be read as saying that the “agency had not provided the full 
story” and that the agency should be forced to “reveal the political basis for its 
decision” so that it also would consider “the opposing political position.”330 
C. Judicial Dislike of Agency Politicization 
Another major hurdle that might stand in the way of giving politics a place 
involves what could be described as some judges’ normative judgments that 
the politicization of agency decisionmaking is dangerous.331 As Professors 
Freeman and Vermeule have explained, this general concern—that bad things 
may come from the politicization of agencies—may very well have been what 
drove the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA to force the EPA to exercise its 
expertise.332 
If it is true that most judges truly believe as a normative matter that the 
politicization of agencies is a bad thing, then judges will be unlikely to give 
politics an accepted role in agency rulemaking. There is good reason, however, 
to doubt that most judges truly believe that any politicization of agencies is a 
bad thing. In light of Chevron’s acknowledgement of the role politics can play 
in agency decisionmaking and other signs that judges are well aware of the 
 
OMB and the agencies it ‘regulates’” but that “Congress’ ability to require such disclosure 
may be limited to some uncertain extent by the doctrine of Executive Privilege”). 
329.  See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251-52 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(concluding that the agency acted improperly in failing to disclose scientific research upon 
which the proposed rule was based); see also EDLEY, supra note 4, at 190 & n.34 (describing 
as an analog “those cases in which courts have rejected agency decisions that seem[] to be 
based on secret or undisclosed expert studies or reasoning”). 
330.  Bressman, supra note 142, at 1783. 
331.  Cf. Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 94 (describing how the Court’s treatment of 
some cases is “tinged with underlying suspicion about politically motivated executive 
usurpation of judgments normally left to experts”). 
332.  See id. at 93-95 (viewing Massachusetts as part of a judicial pattern demonstrating the Court’s 
discomfort with seeing “executive override of expert judgments by professionals or 
agencies”). 
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influences political actors can have on agency decisionmaking,333 judges are not 
likely to believe that political influences should completely be kept out of 
agency decisionmaking.334 Rather, it seems far more likely that judges want to 
avoid seeing too much politicization of agencies, not that they want to avoid 
seeing any politicization at all. Thus, judges—even those judges who are 
skeptical of political influences—might well be willing to modify existing 
judicial doctrine to encourage agencies to openly disclose political influences in 
appropriate circumstances. Doing so would empower courts to ensure that 
political factors are being used in an appropriate fashion, not to covertly distort 
science or to suppress politically inconvenient evidence. 
In addition, bringing political influences out into the open might deter 
courts themselves from covertly making their own political decisions under the 
guise of applying arbitrary and capricious review. A significant amount of 
literature criticizes arbitrary and capricious review by suggesting that the 
results turn on the political and ideological beliefs of the judges applying the 
doctrine.335 This concern that judges are manipulating hard look review to 
reach results that fit their own ideological predilections could be remedied, or 
at least reduced, by requiring agencies openly to disclose political factors 
influencing their rulemaking decisions. If an agency openly disclosed political 
factors that influenced its rulemaking decisions (such as a presidential 
directive) in its rulemaking record, then the reviewing court would have to 
grapple openly with the political factors influencing the agency’s decision, 
making it much harder for the court simply to substitute surreptitiously its 
own policy views under the guise of legal constraints. 
 
333.  See supra notes 158-170 and accompanying text. 
334.  See generally Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 27, at 108-09 (noting the Court must view it 
as “inevitable that political considerations will come into play in executive agencies headed 
by political appointees who are accountable to the President”). 
335.  See, e.g., Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 761 (2008) (providing evidence indicating that judges’ own ideologies play a 
role in judicial review of agency decisions for arbitrariness); Pierce, supra note 125, at 908-09 
(citing “[n]umerous studies [that] have found that the results of hard-look review depend 
primarily on the political and ideological beliefs of the judges who apply the doctrine”); 
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 
1717, 1719, 1769-70 (1997) (concluding that “ideology significantly influences judicial 
decisionmaking on the D.C. Circuit” and discussing how this may call into question the 
benefits of hard look review). 
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D. Separation of Powers Concerns 
A fourth possible objection involves separation of powers concerns. As the 
administrative state grew in the post-New Deal world, the courts condoned 
huge transfers of legislative-like powers to administrative agencies by, for 
example, allowing the nondelegation doctrine to become a toothless 
doctrine.336 The death of the nondelegation doctrine now means that agencies 
often enjoy an unlimited number of actions that they might permissibly take 
when implementing vague, broad statutory commands. Hard look review’s 
insistence on expert-driven decisionmaking can be thought of as a judicial 
“check” against this large power transfer to agencies and as a judicially-
imposed check on political decisionmaking. By enabling courts to engage in 
fairly aggressive judicial review, hard look’s reason-giving requirement allows 
courts to ensure that agencies are engaging in expert-driven decisionmaking 
consistent with Congress’s instructions.337 Courts, accordingly, can more easily 
maintain the fiction that agencies are not actually exercising “lawmaking” 
powers at all but rather are merely “implementing” or “executing” Congress’s 
instructions.338 
If courts were openly to accept political judgment as a valid factor 
supporting agency rulemaking decisions, then courts might have more trouble 
continuing to maintain the fiction that agencies are simply “executing” or 
“implementing” laws set by Congress. Rather, courts would at least implicitly 
 
336.  See generally Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
1231, 1237-40 (1994) (describing the “death” of the nondelegation doctrine and noting that 
“the Supreme Court has not invalidated a congressional statute on nondelegation grounds 
since 1935”). 
337.  Cf. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative 
State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 487 (1989) (noting that “the permissibility of delegating 
regulatory power” has hinged on the courts’ ability to police and check agency exercises of 
delegated power); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth 
Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 
1987 DUKE L.J. 387 (1987) (arguing that State Farm’s heightened reason-giving requirement 
flows from separation of powers principles and responds to the broad delegations of 
legislative authority given to agencies). 
338.  Cf. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (explaining that the text of the 
Constitution permits “no delegation” of legislative powers but does permit executive actors 
to make policy decisions in the context of executing or applying the law set down by 
Congress); id. at 488 (Stevens, J., concurring) (accusing the Court of “pretend[ing]” that 
legislative power is not actually being delegated); Travis H. Mallen, Rediscovering the 
Nondelegation Doctrine Through a Unified Separation of Powers Theory, 81 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 419, 432 (2005) (noting that the sole test for impermissible delegations—the 
“intelligible principle” test—“advances the fiction that administrative rulemaking is not an 
exercise of legislative power when it does not involve too much discretion”). 
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need to recognize that agencies are making political judgments and thus are 
acting essentially as mini legislatures engaged in the process of lawmaking.339 
Those who believe in a robust and vigorous nondelegation doctrine might find 
this change to be quite objectionable given that they believe only Congress has 
the power to legislate. Most, however, embrace a much more pragmatic or 
functionalist take on the nondelegation doctrine and openly accept that 
agencies play a lawmaking role.340 
Furthermore, even under the version of hard look review proposed in this 
Article, hard look review would continue to ensure that agencies engaging in 
lawmaking functions remain faithful to congressional intent and to existing 
evidence and facts. In this sense, hard look review would continue to function 
as a constraint on political decisionmaking.341 It would operate to ensure that 
political judgments do not play an inappropriate role: political judgments alone 
would not be allowed to trump or to nullify congressional intent set forth in a 
particular statutory scheme, nor to justify an administrative decision that runs 
contrary to existing evidence. 
E. Difficulty of Judicial Review 
A final potential objection—and perhaps the most serious objection—
involves questions about whether judges are capable of and whether they 
would be comfortable with the notion of subjecting political influences to legal 
 
339.  Cf. SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 171 (“Agencies ought to be allowed to act and to admit that 
they act as subordinate legislatures making a good deal of law within broad congressional 
constraints and in the face of considerable uncertainty about facts and diverse and changing 
political sentiments.”). 
340.  See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 488 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I am persuaded that it would 
be both wiser and more faithful to what we have actually done in delegation cases to admit 
that agency rulemaking authority is ‘legislative power.’”); Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 
748, 758 (1996) (noting that the nondelegation principle “does not mean . . . that only 
Congress can make a rule of prospective force”); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 
372 (1989) (“[O]ur jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding that in our 
increasingly complex society . . . Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to 
delegate power . . . .”); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make 
Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95-98 (1985) (arguing that accountability concerns 
tip in favor of broad delegations to agencies); Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, 
Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2170-71 
(2004) (arguing for an exclusive delegation doctrine under which Congress has the exclusive 
power to decide when and whether to delegate lawmaking powers). 
341.  Hard look’s purpose, in other words, would not be to constrain political decisionmakers by 
ensuring that decisionmakers are forced to make decisions based solely on technocratic and 
scientific factors. But hard look review would operate to ensure that political influences are 
playing a proper role. 
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discipline.342 As the D.C. Circuit has aptly explained, judges, unlike members 
of Congress or the President, “are insulated from [political] pressures because 
of the nature of the judicial process in which [they] participate.”343 Thus, it 
may be tempting for judges to try to force agency rulemaking decisions into an 
adjudicatory mold and “to look askance at all face-to-face lobbying efforts, 
regardless of the forum in which they occur, merely because [judges] see them 
as inappropriate in the judicial context.”344 
Evidence of judges’ relative discomfort with assessing the political factors 
that feed into legislative-like decisions can be seen in many different places. For 
example, the judiciary’s desire to force federal agencies into an adjudicatory 
mold of agency decisionmaking is evident in how the judiciary has “moved us 
from a vision of rule making as quasi-legislative to one of rule making as quasi-
judicial by requiring all kinds of new adjudicatory style procedures in 
rulemaking,”345 including the detailed reason-giving requirement embraced by 
State Farm.346 In addition, various nonreviewability rules, such as Heckler v. 
Chaney’s rule that nonenforcement decisions are not judicially reviewable,347 
suggest that the courts will sometimes refrain from scrutinizing executive 
decisions that they perceive to turn on factors ill-suited to judicial review, such 
as a lack of agency resources.348 
 
342.  See generally EDLEY, supra note 4, at 189 (“It might be claimed that by ignoring politics the 
courts are able to escape the difficult problem of assessment and balancing that might be 
thrust on them were the veil lifted . . . .”). 
343.  Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
344.  Id. 
345.  SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 118. 
346.  Cf. Am. Radio Relay League v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 246-48 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the courts for expanding arbitrary and 
capricious review from a narrow test into a “far more demanding test” that leads to 
unpredictable results). 
347.  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review 
of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1667-69 (2004) 
(discussing Chaney’s decision to insulate agency failures to enforce from judicial review). 
348.  See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Veneman, 469 F.3d 826, 848 (9th Cir. 2006) (Kozinski, 
J., dissenting) (“[A]n agency may choose not to adopt discretionary regulations for a variety 
of reasons, many of which a court can’t review: a change in policy; a lack of enforcement 
resources; a lack of scientific expertise to address the problem at this time; a change in 
direction based on a determination that the problem is better addressed some other way.”), 
vacated by 490 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2007); WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 817 (D.C. Cir. 
1981) (noting that review of denials of rulemaking petitions is constrained because “[a]n 
agency’s discretionary decision not to regulate a given activity is inevitably based, in large 
measure, on factors not inherently susceptible to judicial resolution—e.g., internal 
management considerations as to budget and personnel; evaluations of its own competence; 
weighing of competing policies within a broad statutory framework”) (internal citations 
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It is true that this Article’s proposal inevitably would force courts to cast 
aside some of their current discomfort with politics. Changing the judicial 
mindset, however, may not be as difficult as it sounds. In many situations, 
judges would not actually need to “weigh” political factors against science and 
evidence but rather would merely be called upon to acknowledge the factual 
existence of a rational and legitimate political influence. This might be the case 
where an agency declined to initiate a completely discretionary rulemaking 
proceeding or decided to withdraw a draft of a discretionary rule based entirely 
on its adherence to known presidential priorities and preferences (e.g., “we 
decline to grant the rulemaking petition because the President wants to develop 
a comprehensive strategy to the problem” or “we decline the rulemaking 
petition because the President wants to be able to negotiate a global solution to 
the problem”). Here, the reviewing court would not need to evaluate the merits 
of the President’s preferences but rather would merely need to acknowledge 
the factual existence of such preferences and to determine that the agency’s 
reliance on these priorities in setting its own discretionary rulemaking agenda 
was rational. 
It might also be the case that no value-laden weighing of political 
influences against facts and evidence would be required where an agency used 
political influence as a “tiebreaker” of sorts to help it choose between multiple 
factually supportable and statutorily permissible options (for example, where 
political influences pushed an agency to choose Rule B rather than Rule A 
where the statute and the science before the agency supported Rule A and B 
equally). In this situation, a reviewing court would not be called upon to weigh 
the merits of the political influences against the weight of the existing evidence 
but rather would simply be called upon to assess as a factual matter whether 
the agency was correct to claim that rational and legitimate political influences 
supported the selection of one factually and legally permissible rule over 
another. 
Where things would be much more complicated for judges are those 
situations in which the science before an agency strongly supports one answer 
(Answer A) but neither the statute nor the science clearly foreclose another 
answer (Answer B). Here, if an agency chose Option B instead of A because B 
was most closely aligned with political influences, such as a presidential 
directive instructing the agency to promulgate Option B because the President 
believed Option B best balanced the costs and the benefits in a way that would 
 
omitted); see also EDLEY, supra note 4, at 180-81 (discussing how political influences are 
sometimes “acknowledged as a reason to treat the agency’s discretion as unreviewable, and 
hence immune to legal discipline”). 
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maximize the public good, then a reviewing court would be faced with directly 
weighing the political influences against the evidence before the agency. 
In assessing the weight to be given to a given political influence, courts 
likely would need to take into account both the content and the form of the 
political influence. The content of the political influence would be relevant 
because, as discussed above, not all political influences should be treated as 
equal.349 Rather, courts will need to draw lines between permissible and 
impermissible political influences. Given courts’ general desire to force agency 
decisionmaking into an adjudicatory mold that resembles judicial proceedings 
sanitized of political influences, courts are not likely to be entirely comfortable 
with this line-drawing task. In addition, they may not believe they have the 
capacity to evaluate or weigh certain political judgments. Yet just because 
courts do not have much experience identifying and weighing political 
influences does not mean that courts should give up on the task.350 
Furthermore, as discussed above, defining valid “political” factors as those 
influences coming from political actors that speak to policy judgments or 
value-laden judgments rather than raw partisan politics should go a long way 
toward easing courts’ discomfort with the notion of giving “politics” a place.351 
In addition to taking the content of political influences into account when 
assessing the weight to be given to a given political influence, courts also would 
need to take the form of the political influence into account. As Edley has 
suggested, some political influences may be articulated in a form designed to 
reinforce some of the positive attributes of politics, such as accountability, 
public participation, and representativeness, whereas other influences may be 
articulated in a form that underscores the negative attributes of politics, such as 
willfulness and tyranny of the majority.352 If courts pay attention to the form of 
the political influences relied upon by an agency, then courts can ensure that 
 
349.  See supra Section III.B. In her forthcoming article, Professor Mendelson has reached a 
similar conclusion about the importance of the content of political influences. See 
Mendelson, supra note 123, at 4 (arguing that whether presidential influences on agency 
decisions help to increase or decrease legitimacy depends “on the content of that influence”). 
350.  Cf. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“As judges . . . we must refrain 
from the easy temptation to look askance at all face-to-face lobbying efforts, regardless of 
the forum in which they occur, merely because we see them as inappropriate in the judicial 
context.”); SHAPIRO, supra note 13, at 171 (arguing that judges need to remember “what rule-
making agencies are” and need to stop treating them “as if they were courts instead of 
subordinate legislatures” free to make law in the face of “diverse and changing political 
sentiments”). 
351.  See supra Section III.B. 
352.  See EDLEY, supra note 4, at 21 fig.1; cf. id. at 196-97 (arguing that politics should be accepted 
as “good politics” only where the political influences “embody the positive attributes like 
representativeness and accountability”). 
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the positive aspects of politics are reinforced. Such an approach would likely 
mean that agency reliance on publicly announced presidential directives or 
publicly available “prompt letters” issued by OIRA could be viewed as 
permissible (depending on the content of the directives and letters), whereas 
agency reliance on backdoor political tactics would be viewed as impermissible 
because such influences fail to reinforce notions of accountability, 
representativeness, or public participation. 
conclusion 
The judiciary’s current formulation of arbitrary and capricious review, 
which focuses on whether agencies have adequately explained their decisions in 
technocratic rather than political terms, has incentivized agencies to hide 
behind technocratic façades. Expanding current conceptions of arbitrary and 
capricious review beyond its singular technocratic focus—so that credit also 
would be given to certain influences from political actors that an agency openly 
and transparently discloses and relies upon in its rulemaking record—would 
yield many significant benefits. Such a move would better harmonize arbitrary 
and capricious review with other major administrative law doctrines, such as 
Chevron deference, which seem to embrace the political control model of 
agency decisionmaking. Such a change would also enable political influences to 
come out into the open, thereby facilitating greater political accountability. In 
addition, it could lead courts to defer to agencies more often, thereby offering a 
means of softening the “ossification” charge frequently raised against arbitrary 
and capricious review. Finally, encouraging agencies to disclose political factors 
could help to create a more effective separation between science and politics. 
Despite the benefits of giving politics a place in arbitrary and capricious 
review, the success of the expanded conception of arbitrary and capricious 
review proposed here ultimately will rest in the hands of courts and agencies. 
Agencies will need to become comfortable openly acknowledging influences by 
political actors and explaining their decisions in both technocratic and political 
terms, and the courts will need to acknowledge that an agency’s reliance on 
influences from political actors that involve policy considerations and value 
judgments can help to provide a reasonable, nonarbitrary explanation in the 
rulemaking context. Although certainly this calls for significant change on the 
part of agencies and courts, there are signs that such change might not be all 
that far off. The Court’s recent decision in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 
for example, suggests that at least some members of the current Court might 
be ready to acknowledge a role for political influences in agency 
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decisionmaking.353 Similarly, the NHTSA’s recent rule setting fuel efficiency 
standards for cars and light trucks could serve as a sign that agencies under the 
Obama Administration might more readily acknowledge and disclose 
presidential oversight.354 
 
353.  See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text. 
354.  See supra notes 110-115 and accompanying text. 
